Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family-Controlled Firms in Japan
By Toru Yoshikawa, Abdul Rasheed. 2010
188 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper focuses on a type of firms that have been traditionally neglected in both family business and governance research, namely, family-controlled, publicly-listed firms. Although principal–agent conflicts may be less prevalent in such firms, family control can potentially give rise to principal–principal conflicts, leading to expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by family owners. Superior firm performance and the willingness to distribute the profits through dividend payments would suggest the absence of such expropriation. Based on a sample of 210 OTC firms in Japan, we examined the relationships between family control and dividend payouts and profitability. Our results indicate that family control was positively related to dividend payouts. Further, we found that while foreign ownership interacted with family control to reduce dividend payouts and increase profitability, bank ownership did not have such an effect.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e78fca7a0d3749068285f471d88ffe75500f5075
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In Accounting
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Citations in the corpus
- Financing Decisions in Family Businesses: A Review and Suggestions for Developing the Field (2017, background): “(2008) Equity Asymmetric information between shareholders Supply FB/NFB Italy Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) Debt Asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders Supply FB/NFB Belgium Waisman (2013) Debt Asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders Supply FB/NFB USA Walk”
- Markets, Hierarchies, and Families: Toward a Transaction Cost Theory of the Family Firm (2010, unknown): “…the mounting empirical evidence that family firms survive and thrive within and across very different host societies (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; La Porta et al., 1999; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010) and in direct competition with organizations that more closely conform to Chandlerian managerial ideals.”
- Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “Finally, a number of other theories have been adopted to explain the effect of ownership types on the firm’s outcomes—for example, stewardship theory (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010), or social network theory (Zhou & Delios, 2012).”