The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia

By Stijn Claessens, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang. 2006

312 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e37caafcd28edc4fc53173d9aac2f8f4186ba8a2

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Citations in the corpus

Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt (2013, background): “…a within-country analysis can use a clear and consistent definition of business groups, while group definitions vary substantially across countries (Claessens et al., 2006; Khanna, 2000).1 Second, as firms in the same country face the same institutional environment, a single-country analysis can…”
Financial flexibility, corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises (2013, unknown): “In this respect, our study builds on the study of Claessens et al. (2006), which indicates that a group membership in the pre crisis period is beneficial only for mature firms with sluggish growth.”
Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China (2011, background): “Claessens et al. (2002) find that tunneling becomesmore severe when the controlling shareholders' controlling right exceeds their ownership right.”
Business group affiliation, performance, context, and strategy: a meta-analysis (2011, unknown): “(Claessens et al., 2006; Lee, Peng, & Lee, 2008).”
Business groups in developing capital markets: Towards a complementarity perspective (2015, background): “…analyses have either focused only on affiliate firms that are publicly listed or have not distinguished between listed and unlisted affiliate firms (Carney et al., 2011; Claessens, Fan, and Lang, 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Manikandan and Ramachandran, 2014; Singh and Gaur, 2009).”
Attendance of Board Meetings and Company Performance: Evidence from Taiwan (2013, background): “This potential of expropriation can be measured by divergence between control and cash-flow rights of the ultimate shareholder (Excess), where control is based on direct and indirect voting rights of the ultimate shareholder (Claessens et al. 2000, 2006; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005).”
Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups (2003, background): “The columns partition the sample by the incentives to manage earnings, as defined in section 3.”
Complex Ownership and Capital Structure (2012, unknown): “Examining a sample of East Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2006) find that the average ownership in Japan is 5.13% and the control share is 10.05% over the period 1994-1996. Widely held firms are classified as firms with no shareholders holding more than 20% equity ownership. These firms comprise”