Complex Ownership and Capital Structure

133 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “To the extent that leverage affects firm value and its riskiness, we expect that debt may facilitate expropriation by controlling shareholders as long as the firms face no financial distress (see Paligorova and Xu, 2012).”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “For instance, groups that are pyramidal in structure provide their controlling owners with strong incentives to channel resources from firms where they have low cash flow rights to those where they have high cash flow rights (Bertrand et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000; Paligorova and Xu, 2012).”
Varieties in state capitalism and corporate innovation: Evidence from an emerging economy (2021, background): “As detailed in La Porta et al. (1999) and Paligorova and Xu (2012), the pyramid structure is applied by the ultimate controlling shareholders to create a set of control chains within which a listed firm may be controlled by another firm whose controlling shares in turn lie in the hands of the…”