Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups

By Ming Jian, T. Wong, Kevin C. W. Chen, Chul W. Park, Woo-min Wu, K. Chan, Kee-Hong Bae. 2003

247 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/68d25c85fe598ae68095b5a4a8e255ed743abddb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Chen Lin
2. Yue Ma
3. J. Sarkar
4. Yohanes E. Riyanto
5. Dongwei Su
6. K. Sen
7. Subrata Sarkar
8. Linda A. Toolsema

In Finance

1. Yue Ma
2. J. Sarkar
3. Chen Lin
4. Yohanes E. Riyanto
5. Dongwei Su
6. Linda A. Toolsema
7. G. Schepens
8. Jayesh Kumar

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate governance and firm efficiency: Evidence from China's publicly listed firms (2009, background): “19 In a recent study, Jian and Wong (2004) find that group-controlled firms report abnormally high levels of related party sales when firms manipulate earnings to obtain permission to issue new equity or avoid being de-listed due to poor performance.”
• Board of Directors and Opportunistic Earnings Management: Evidence from India (2008, background): “8 See for example, Kim and Yi (2005) for Korea, Liu and Lu (2004) and ( Jian and Wong, 2003 ) in the case of”
• Tunneling and propping: a justification for pyramidal ownership (2008, background): “A study by Jian and Wong (2003) using a sample of 131 Chinese listed firms that have conducted related party transactions (i.”