Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China

By Winnie Peng, Zhishu Yang. 2011

447 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f1ac90619030f425a7cf6c180e856c4cbab5e4b4

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In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

To what extent does corporate liquidity affect M&A decisions, method of payment and performance? Evidence from China (2017, result): “These findings are in line with Roll (1986) and Harford (1999), and support the hubris theory, according to which takeover deals can be promoted by firms’ better performance and returns.”
Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “controlling shareholder (Cheung et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2010), and the inadequacy of the existing laws to curb the problem are well documented in many emerging countries (see Jiang et al.”
Bank financing and corporate governance (2015, unknown): “This institutional feature, together with weak legal or regulatory protections for minority shareholders, makes the Chinese stock market highly conducive for tunneling activities (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2011).”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “Related party transactions (RPTs) have been identified as important channels through which controlling shareholders tunnel or prop the listed companies (Cheung et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2011).”
Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms (2011, background): “The issues regarding the expropriation of minority shareholders are especially relevant in economies with weak legal protection or poorer governance standards (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Peng et al., 2011).”
Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience☆ (2010, background): “A second group of China studies explored the effect of ownership structures on earnings management in Chinese firms (Liu and Lu, 2007; Chen, Lee, and Li, 2003; Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2006; Jian and Wong, 2010).”
Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism (2014, background): “However, tunneling greatly harms listed firms’ operations and the interests of minority shareholders (Bae et al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2006).”
Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, unknown): “Compared to SOEs, family firms appear to be less likely to use related party transactions for “tunneling” (Peng et al., 2011; Ying and Wang, 2013).”
Do Social Ties between External Auditors and Audit Committee Members Affect Audit Quality (2016, background): “However, the bankruptcy risk for Chinese public firms is virtually zero ⎯ since listing status is quite valuable, controlling shareholders routinely bail out financially distressed listed firms before they reach insolvency (Peng et al. 2011).”