How Infants Know Minds

By Vasudevi Reddy. 2008

668 citations recorded by the source corpus.

* Acknowledgments *1. A Puzzle *2. Minding the Gap *3. A Second-Person Approach *4. Neonatal Imitation: First Contact *5. Early Conversations *6. Feeling Attention *7. Self-Consciousness *8. Playing with Intentions *9. Sharing Funniness *10. Early Deceiving: Lying, Faking, and Pretending *11. Other Minds and Other Cultures * Notes * Index

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Education

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e0bc44942163bb7fb81b61a679ca37cf45a7ecda

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In Developmental and Educational Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

The Development of Pointing: From Personal Directedness to Interpersonal Direction (2010, background): “…focusing on infants’ activity and gradual differentiation of self from other, takes the social process as the starting point and minds emerge from this interaction [e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2010; Fogel, 1993; Jopling, 1993; Mead, 1934; Müller & Carpendale, 2004; Overton, 2006; Reddy, 2008].”
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation (2009, background): “Reddy (2008) suggests that the best framework for understanding the phenomenon of neonate imitation is to pose the question of its significance for the infant.”
Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds (2012, background): “Drawing upon the classical phenomenological discussions, a number of contemporary theorists have recently defended a similar DP view of social cognition (Gallagher 2008; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; cf. Hobson 2008, Reddy 2008).”
When Words Just Won’t Do: Introducing Parental Embodied Mentalizing (2011, positive): “Specifically, we hypothesize that PEM determines the parent's capacity to recognize, attend, regulate, or ignore the infant's bodily expressions of distress and anxiety, as well as those of exploration and playfulness (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2008; Reddy, 2008; Trevarthen, 2005).”
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience (2013, neutral): “Activation overlays based on a reanalysis of data taken from: Schilbach et al. (2010b). Schilbach et al.”
Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology (2019, background): “These are examples from various literary, academic, and societal investigations, see(Reddy 2008, Jacobs 1961, Le Guin 2004, Simpson 2014, de Saint-Exupéry 1943, Lorde 2012, Dissanayake 2000, Welch 2019, Lugones 1987, Kontos and Naglie 2009, Zeiler 2014, de Boer et al. 2019, Needs and…”
What is it like to be a person who knows nothing? Defining the active intersubjective mind of a newborn human being (2011, background): “…and 'values' -- the agreements of intending they affirm, and in the precise associations they make, by emotional referencing (Klinnert et al.,1983; Reddy, 2008), to beneficial or dangerous experiences of acting in another time and place – that is, by human feelings that give aesthetic appraisal…”
The phenomenology and development of social perspectives (2013, background): “Already at 2 months of age, they are aware of their own visibility to others, judging from their attempts to reduce that visibility in coy-like reactions (Reddy 2008, p. 139).”
Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification (2009, background): “Furthermore, as shown by Reddy (2008), few-months-old preverbal infants when engaged in social interactions show even signs of so-called self-conscious emotions like embarrassment, pride, and coyness at a developmental age preceding the onset of self-reflective consciousness, definitely well before…”
The musical art of infant conversation: Narrating in the time of sympathetic experience, without rational interpretation, before words (2008, background): “Development of human psychological abilities — intentional, cognitive and emotional — appears to be reflect a succession of age-related changes in innate motivations for acting with increasing awareness and memory of the consequences, and for engaging in new ways with the intentions of others and wi”
Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)active approach (2009, background): “So the distinctive ethical framework that Spinoza offers (one which is, regrettably, given less exposure than it deserves) carries at its heart a drive to affective selfreflection (Torrance 2005). Emotions, particularly the distinctive moral emotions, figured prominently in the moral psychology and ”
Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action (2013, background): “…body of literature that attends to the importance of pre-conceptual goal-directedness for learning and development (Adolf et al., 2010; Frye, 1991; Hobson, 2002; Iversen, 2010; Reddy, 2008; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011; Stern, 2010; Stewart et al., 2011; Thelen, 1989; Trevarthen & Delafield-Butt, 2013a).”
From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again (2015, background): “Enactivists would disagree with the premises (a) and (b); furthermore, there are wellestablished ties between enactive research and developmental psychologists whose work demonstrates the robustness of young children’s social cognitive abilities (e.g. Trevarthen 1979; Reddy 2008).”
Dynamic process methodology in the social and developmental sciences (2009, background): “None of the findings that have made their way to the textbooks could have been obtained had their creators ardently following the textbooks of their times (Reddy, 2008).”