A random nth-price auction

By Jason F. Shogren, Michael Margolis, C. Koo, John A. List. 2001

302 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/daa4d33d04ffff4f1917d3bfb0c147db131553a5

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Citations in the corpus

Effect of information about benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified food: evidence from experimental auctions in the United States, England, and France (2004, background): “Subjects with valuations far away from the market price may decide to bid zero in a WTP auction once they find out they have no chance of winning (Shogren et al., 2001b).”
Consumer expectations, liking and willingness to pay for specialty foods : Do sensory characteristics tell the whole story? (2006, background): “This feature assures a greater involvement of participant submitting very low bids (off margin bidders) who face a very low probability of winning and making real payments in standard Vickrey auctions ( Shogren, Margolis, Koo, & List, 2001 ).”
Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods (2004, background): “Yes, with multiple rounds Yes, with multiple rounds Yes No References Vickrey, Shogren et al. (2001b) Shogren et al. (2001b) Vickrey; Coppinger, Smith, and Titus Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak; Irwin et al. Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak introduced the BDM mechanism as a way to induce individuals to t”
Revealing consumers' willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction (2004, background): “Shogren et al. (2001) compare bidder behavior in the random kth price auction and the second price sealed bid auction.”
Definition, Measurement and Determinants of the Consumer's Willingness to Pay: A Critical Synthesis and Avenues for Further Research (2009, background): “Theoretically, a rational bidder is encouraged to reveal his real WTP, thus limiting the occurrence of strategic bias (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Kagel, 1995; Shogren et al 2001).”
Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA (2001, background): “See Shogren et al. (1994b) for some evidence that the second-price auction seems relatively robust in revealing non-induced preferences given alternative configurations of format and complexity.”
The Effects of Prior Beliefs and Learning on Consumers' Acceptance of Genetically Modified Foods (2007, background): “The random nth-price auction mechanism has been shown to be superior to a 2nd-price Vickery auction for eliciting consumers’ entire demand curve for new goods (Shogren et al., 2001).”
Effects and Value of Verifiable Information in a Controversial Market: Evidence from Lab Auctions of Genetically Modified Food (2007, unknown): “Thus, the random nth price auction does a better job of keeping all bidders engaged in the auction relative to other demand revealing auctions like the Vickery auction and the BDM (Shogren et al. 2001, Lusk and Rousu).”
Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, unknown): “Here off-the-margin bidders tend to over-bid if they perceive their induced value is far removed from the potential market clearing price in a real auction (see for example, Shogren et al., 2001; Knetsch et al., 2001).”
Meat Traceability: Are U.S. Consumers Willing to Pay for It? (2002, unknown): “4This is the traceability portion of TT A. 5 Subject engagement in the auction was one reason behind the use of the random nth-price auction in Shogren et al. (2001).”