Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA

By Jason F. Shogren, Sungwon Cho, C. Koo, John A. List, Changwon Park, P. Polo, Robert M. Wilhelmi. 2001

189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bdf1a86791e23aa8ffd48837b21e08f9258813c1

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In Economics and Econometrics

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Citations in the corpus

Do Anomalies Disappear in Repeated Markets (2003, background): “Two studies showing this result are of particular interest in the context of this paper: Shogren et al (2001) report erosion of the gap between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) when values of goods are elicited in repeated auctions; and Cox and Grether (1996) report decay of…”
The Value of Groups (2009, unknown): “…mechanisms supply an incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting individual valuations and in practice there is evidence that when they are repeated some of the well known experimental decision anomalies notably diminish (see James C. Cox and David M. Grether, 1996 and Jason Shogren et al., 2001).”
Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods (2004, background): “To determine whether reference-dependent preferences exist, we test the hypothesis: Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581081”
Eliciting and Utilizing Willingness to Pay: Evidence from Field Trials in Northern Ghana (2020, unknown): “In addition, several studies explicitly compare BDM with other incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms and find differences in elicited WTP (Rutstram 1998; Shogren et al. 2001; Noussair et al. 2004).”
Meat Traceability: Are U.S. Consumers Willing to Pay for It? (2002, unknown): “4This is the traceability portion of TT A. 5 Subject engagement in the auction was one reason behind the use of the random nth-price auction in Shogren et al. (2001).”
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods (2006, background): “Recent claims that the BDM is incentive compatible (without conditions) for non-random goods can be found in Davis and Holt (1993, p.461), Kahneman et al. (1990, p. 1336), Rutstro˜m (1998, p. 428), and Shogren et al. (2001, p. 98) .”
Willingness-to-pay for food safety: an experimental investigation of quality certification on bidding behaviour (2004, background): “Furthermore, their perception itself is determined to a large extent by their knowledge of the health risk and their confidence in the public health policies implemented by the authorities.”
On Behavioral-Environmental Economics (2008, result): “This market-driven rationality idea was supported by Shogren et al. (1994, 2001), who compared stated values with repeated market interactions.”
In-Store Valuation of Steak Tenderness (2001, background): “5 Recent work by Shogren et al. (2000) emphasizes the provision of a market environment with feedback in valuation studies.”
ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION AND AUCTION INSTITUTIONS FOR PREDICTING CONSUMER WILLINGESS TO PAY FOR NONGENETICALLY MODIFIED CORN CHIPS (2001, background): “Experimental economics are increasingly being used to estimate consumer demand for newly developed food products (Buzby et al.; Fox et al.; Fox; Hayes et al.; Lusk et al.; Melton et al.; Roosen et al.; Shogren et al., 2000).”
Preference Anomalies, Preference Elicitation and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis (2005, background): “For example, in some studies that allowed subjects to acquire experience through repetition with feedback and incentives, WTP and WTA converged (Coursey et al. 1987; Shogren et al. 1994, 2001; List and Shogren 1999) and preference reversal subsided (Cox and Grether 1996; Braga and Starmer 2003).”
The impact of experience on risk taking, overconfidence, and herding of fund managers: Complementary survey evidence (2006, background): “experiments. In later rounds this disparity, however, disappears [cf. Shogren et al. (2001) ,”