Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies? (Part 2: The Governance of Banks)

By Renée B. Adams, Hamid Mehran. 2003

877 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d9fceb4390d6e1817c97dc41fd2dc2ef4d89725e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States (2005, background): “Banks, however, have larger boards than firms in other industries (Adams and Mehran, 2003).”
Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Mediterranean Countries (2009, background): “In fact, it is proved by Adams and Mehran (2003), Houston and James (1995), John and Qian (2003), that pay-performance sensitivity in banking is lower than in other industries.”
Do Directors Perform for Pay (2008, neutral): “Our sample of data on BHC directors builds upon the sample used in Adams and Mehran (2003).”
Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies (2009, background): “Adams and Mehran (2003) and Macey and O'Hara (2003) find systematic differences between the governance of banking and manufacturing firms and highlight the point that governance structures are industry specific.”
The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure (2010, neutral): “Frank and 29 There are other interesting differences in the governance of banks relative to non-financial firms, which are documented in Adams and Mehran (2003), including the absence of hostile take-overs in banking, differences in board sizes and CEO stakes.”
Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence (2008, background): “1997; Adams and Mehran, 2003). Prowse (1997) examines relationship between the”
Bank Income Smoothing, Ownership Concentration and the Regulatory Environment (2014, background): “Banks have consequently a unique form of corporate governance (Adams and Mehran 2003), with more stakeholders than non-financial firms, including depositors, non-insured debtholders, deposit insurers and regulators.”
Endogenously Structured Boards of Directors in Banks (2010, methodology): “This paper complements and extends Adams and Mehran’s (2009) study, which investigates bank board governance for a sample of 35 BHCs from 1959 to 1999. They illustrate that bank board size relates to M&A activity and organizational structure. However, they have not shown the determinants of other im”
Moderating effects of corporate governance mechanism on the relation between capital structure and firm performance (2021, background): “Adams and Mehran (2002) argued that some companies need large boards for effective oversight. Heng et al. (2012) showed an inverse relationship between the total number of board members and the ratio of debt to assets. In contrast, several other studies (e.g., Isik & Ince, 2016; Mollah et al., 2012;”
Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks (2013, background): “…(1999) found that CEO compensation at commercial banks was significantly less performance sensitive than CEO compensation at investment banks, and Adams and Mehran (2003) found that commercial banks paid their CEOs relatively large cash compensation (salary and bonus) but relatively small stock…”
Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks (2011, background): “Adams & Mehran (2003, 2005) find that banks have larger boards due to their complex organizational structure and presence of more committees, such as lending and credit risk committees.”
Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies (2011, background): “…does not appear to take any special features of banks into account.4 The fact that bank boards are larger in the U.K. than those of other listed firms mirrors the findings for the U.S. (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 2003; Adams, 2009a; Booth, Cornett and Tehranian, 2002, Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).”
Governance mechanisms in Spanish banks. Does ownership matter (2004, background): “1 Although much of what is said also applies to banks, it is true that the banking firm has significant differences with respect to corporations in other economic sectors, and this justifies a special interest in its governance problems (Prowse, 1997; Adams and Mehran, 2003).”
Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from New Zealand (2011, background): “Large boards were supported on the ground that they would provide greater monitoring and advice (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998; Adam & Mehran, 2003; Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2004; Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008).”
The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform Better? (2012, neutral): “A further difficulty is that, as noted by Adams and Mehran (2003) for the U.S., regulation typically affects governance more for financial institutions than it does for other firms.”