Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies
By Renée B. Adams, Hamid Mehran. 2011
643 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/198161318fd4e3349f8c06d7c5bd20106bc4f709
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Haithem Nagati
- Mehdi Nekhili
- Tawhid Chtioui
- Sabur Mollah
- Jonathan M. Williams
- Tim King
- Abhishek Srivastav
- H. Farag
In Finance
- Sabur Mollah
- Kevin Keasey
- Jonathan M. Williams
- Tim King
- Abhishek Srivastav
- Yizhe Dong
- A. Boateng
- Mehdi Nekhili
Citations in the corpus
- Age diversity, directors' personal values, and bank performance (2016, background): “…include the natural logarithm of board size (Board Size), which is found to have a significant effect on bank performance (Staikouras et al., 2007; Adams and Mehran, 2012), the percentage of independent directors (Independent Director) who may have strong incentives to scrutinize the management…”
- What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, background): “Bank-specific Attributes: Prior evidence shows that larger banks, better-capitalised banks, and banks with better investment opportunities report greater profitability (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Bennett et al., 2015).”
- Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, background): “While, as suggested by Adams and Mehran (2012), it is problematic to identify an appropriate instrument in governance studies, in our context some support comes from the cross-country dimension of our analysis.”
- Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “Also, because they are regulated differently, directors in financial and real estate companies face greater liability risks compared to directors of non-financial firms ( Adams and Mehran, 2012 ).”
- Intellectual Capital Performance and Profitability of Banks: Evidence from Pakistan (2019, background): “Board Size: Shareholders require a large and diverse board to minimize agency problems, to deal with the complexity of banking operation, and to improve performance (Adams and Mehran 2003; Adams and Mehran 2012; Yermack 1996).”
- Board diversity and financial fragility: Evidence from European banks (2017, background): “7 of board diversity in financial institutions (Adams and Mehran, 2012). However, there have been a few studies which have focussed on the impact of board diversity in the banking industry; these studies have tended to focus on the US; see for example Richard (2000); Adams and Funk (2012); and Hagen”
- The governance, risk-taking, and performance of Islamic banks (2016, positive): “The studies by Sierra et al. (2006), Anders and Valledado (2008), Adams and Mehran (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012), Wintoki et al. (2012), and Pathan and Faff (2013) investigate the governance mechanism and its effect on firms’ performance and value.”
- Exploring the Nexus Between Human Capital, Corporate Governance and Performance: Evidence from Islamic Banks (2017, positive): “Studies examining the relationship between governance mechanisms and the performance of conventional banks (see Adams and Mehran, 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Francis et al., 2012) have commonly considered board size, board independence and CEO role duality.”
- Board gender diversity and firm performance: The UK evidence (2020, result): “This result is in line with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), and Adams and Mehran (2012) but at variance with the findings of Pathan and Faff (2013) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).”