Do Directors Perform for Pay

By Renée B. Adams, Daniel Ferreira. 2008

444 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c19156e4835b085884078ae3f64e92e759fd4c92

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Citations in the corpus

Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies (2011, background): “While we find the results for the other governance controls suggestive, we caution against interpreting them as consistent with a particular theory that does not concern board structure in BHCs.”
Attendance of Board Meetings and Company Performance: Evidence from Taiwan (2013, background): “The major duty of directors, especially for outside directors, is to attend board meetings because board meeting is the main vehicle for them to collect information, make decisions and monitor the management (Adams and Ferreira, 2008).”
Corporate Performance, Board Structure and its Determinants in the Banking Industry (2005, unknown): “This is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2005), who document that the attendance behavior of BHC directors improves as board meeting fees increase.”
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “…and profitability ( Fich and Shivdasani, 2006 ), excessive EO pay ( Core et al., 1999 ), greater attendance problems suggest- ng weaker monitoring ( Adams and Ferreira, 2008 ), a negative maret reaction to the increased potential workload of these directors Falato et al., 2014 ), and more…”
Socially Responsible Firms (2016, background): “, return on assets (ROA) or Tobin‘s q) over a long time series, which is captured by the beta coefficient on the compensation variable for each individual firm (Adams and Ferreira, 2008).”
Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? (2014, background): “For example, Yermack (2004), Fich (2005), Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Adams and Ferreira (2008) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) each control for director reputation incentives, measured by firm size. Furthermore, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the larger the firm, the more visibility, prestige and th”
Governance and the Financial Crisis (2009, unknown): “For example, even though Federal Reserve Banks in theory penalize directors for poor attendance behavior, Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that the attendance behavior of directors of bank holding companies (BHCs) at board meetings is worse than in nonfinancial firms.”
Perceived competition, profitability and the withholding of information about sales and the cost of sales (2009, background): “Although these costs are small, Adams and Ferreira (2008) provide evidence from board meeting fees and meeting attendance that directors respond to even small monetary incentives.”
Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance During the 2007–08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study (2011, background): “An independent director in financial institutions can therefore be induced by reputation incentives to be constrained from excessive risk-taking behaviors in order to improve governance mechanisms and performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2008; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 2004).”