Governance mechanisms in Spanish banks. Does ownership matter

By R. Crespí, Miguel A. García-Cestona, V. Salas. 2004

193 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9bb4668b67e3a48be719513768d0466e9e40550c

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Citations in the corpus

Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk (2014, unknown): “Nonetheless, similarly to the case of the link between risk and performance, relatively few studies focus on the role of corporate governance on bank performance (see, e.g., Simpson and Gleason 1999; Macey and O’Hara 2003; Crespı́ et al. 2004; de Andres and Vallelado 2008; Laeven and Levine 2009).”
Performance and governance in microfinance institutions (2009, result): “ Crespi et al. (2004) find similar results when they compare savings banks and commercial banks in Spain.”
A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area (2011, unknown): “29 Crespí et al. (2004) find that competition in retail banking in Spain, including both commercial and savings banks, remains high.”
Governance and Performance Revisited (2004, background): “The governance effect of product market competition is analyzed by Palmer (1973) and Crespi et al. (2004), and the findings are consistent with the notion that outside owner monitoring and product market competition are substitute mechanisms.”
Performance and trade-offs in microfinance organisations--does ownership matter? (2008, background): “In mature bank-markets where different ownership types co-exist, researchers find little evidence to suggest that ownership type influences operational efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2001, Crespi et al., 2004, ESBG, 2004).”
Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the Board of Directors (2008, background): “…exclusively independent directors. nisms will be the board of directors, while other internal mechanisms, such as CEO compensation or ownership structure, might also prove effective mechanisms to deal with governance problems (Brickley and James, 1987; Crespí et al., 2004; Caprio et al., 2007).”