Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks

By Robert DeYoung, Emma Y. Peng, Meng Yan. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2013

272 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3b6a83628290edf3bef3e2264a4433498259c345

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In Accounting

1. Wenxuan Hou
2. Pedro Matos
3. Michael Firth
4. David H. Erkens
5. Mingyi Hung
6. Anup Agrawal
7. Tim King
8. Yizhe Dong

In Finance

1. Wenxuan Hou
2. Pedro Matos
3. David H. Erkens
4. Michael Firth
5. Anup Agrawal
6. Mingyi Hung
7. Tim King
8. Yizhe Dong

Citations in the corpus

• CEO Narcissism, Risk-Taking, and Resilience: An Empirical Analysis in U.S. Commercial Banks (2019, methodology): “All of these policies have been found to increase banks’ inherent riskiness (Apergis, 2014; Black & Hazelwood, 2013; DeYoung & Torna, 2013; DeYoung et al., 2013).”
• Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, background): “At the macroeconomic level, we include the real GDP growth rate to control for the general economic environment in China over the sample period, and a dummy variable for the recent financial crisis (years 2008-2011) to capture its impact (Aebi et al., 2012; DeYoung et al., 2013).”
• Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012, background): “10 As discussed in DeYoung et al. (2012), due to innovations and deregulation in financial markets the business model of large banks has switched from the traditional “originate-and-hold” lending model that relies on interest income to an “originate-and-securitize” lending model that relies heavily ”
• The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking (2012, background): “So far, the evidence on executive compensation and bank risk-taking in the financial crisis has been mixed (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009, DeYoung et al. 2009).”
• CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “The risk-taking incentives of executives may be exacerbated if they receive options n bank’s equity as compensation instead of shares.32 DeYoung et al. (2013) show that before the onset of the financial risis (2000-2006), US banks’ CEO compensation was changed to ncourage executives to exploit new…”
• Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk: International Evidence (2014, unknown): “DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2013) further find that CEO risk-taking incentives lead to riskier business policy decisions (regarding loans to businesses, non-interest based banking activities, and investment in mortgage-backed securities) at US commercial banks over the 1994-2006 period, especially in…”
• Does Local Religiosity Matter for Bank Risk-Taking? (2016, background): “Recent studies also find this relation in the banking industry (see, e.g., DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2013), and Mehran and Rosenberg (2008)).”
• What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, background): “…shows that banks had begun to increasingly prioritise fee-based activities to improve performance and take advantage of the emergence of new investment opportunities in the period before the sub-prime crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; DeYoung et al., 2013).”