The Coupling of Ownership and Control and the Allocation of Financial Resources: Evidence from Hong Kong

By M. Carney, Eric Gedajlovic. 2002

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d6f8f8d80eb25181002ea0d6cee2c90e7dacde8a

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Citations in the corpus

A framework for comparing entrepreneurship processes across nations (2005, background): “…system is more dynamic, open and reciprocal: that is, just as a nation’s social context influences an entrepreneur’s behaviors, so too its behaviors influence the social contexts by filling institutional gaps and by addressing unmet needs (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002a).”
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, background): “As Table 1 shows, researchers have measured ability as discretion in terms of the family’s ownership control (Carney and Gedajlovic 2002; Dyer and Whetten 2006; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; McConaughy et al. 2001; Mishra, Randøy, and Jenssen 2001; Randoy and Goel 2003; Westhead, Cowling, and Howorth…”
Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding (2009, background): “Characteristic for this region is that investors here have opted massively for the governance strategy of concentrated ownership (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).”
How does family control influence firm strategy and performance? A meta-analysis of us publicly listed firms (2015, background): “…of FFs arise from advantages they possess in developing and utilizing their social capital (e.g., Granovetter, 2005), reputational assets (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002), and relational contracting skills (e.g., Gilson, 2007), which allow them to fill “institutional voids” (Carney,…”
Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, background): “…(continental) Europe, and Latin America, the vast majority of large, publicly traded firms are family owned and controlled (Ahlstrom et al., 2004; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; de Miguel et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2001; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998, 2002; La Porta et…”
Strategic Innovation and the Administrative Heritage of East Asian Family Business Groups (2003, background): “Under these conditions, goals related to patient capital and large scale or enterprise growth give way to a concern for near-term profitability and family wealth preservation (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002).”
Does family business excel in firm performance? An institution-based view (2012, background): “publicly traded firms either owned or controlled by families ( Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002).”
Corporate Governance and Performance in Publicly Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan (2005, background): “An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Strategic Management Society MiniConference on “Strategy Research in Emerging Economies” (Hong Kong, December 2003) and the 2004 Academy of International Business Annual Conference, (Stockholm, Sweden).”
Latin America Management Research: Review, Synthesis, and Extension (2011, background): “For example, firm performance has been associated with the coupling of ownership and control (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002), the presence of different types (institutional vs. corporate) of foreign shareholders (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006), the presence of organizational slack (Tan & Peng, 2003) and…”
Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family-Controlled Firms in Japan (2010, background): “Most of the developing economies in South America, and countries like India and Korea, are dominated by family-owned firms, often forming business groups that directly own several unrelated firms (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Classens et al., 2000).”
Family-Driven Innovation: Resolving the Paradox in Family Firms (2015, background): “we go there?” For example, the family’s strategic control of a firm’s assets relative to its ownership may be enhanced through the establishment of pyramids, crossholdings, and dual voting class shares,(40) and the family may be able to bypass the board when making strategic decisions.(41) On the ot”
Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “…East Asia where significant corporate wealth is concentrated among a few families, and more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Chang, 2003; Claessens et al., 1999; Filatotchev et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999).”
Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, background): “Outside, nonfamily managers may significantly deviate from pursuing the interests of both the family and the minority shareholders (Burkart et al., 2003).”
Financing Decisions in Family Businesses: A Review and Suggestions for Developing the Field (2017, background): “(2008) Equity Asymmetric information between shareholders Supply FB/NFB Italy Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) Debt Asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders Supply FB/NFB Belgium Waisman (2013) Debt Asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders Supply FB/NFB USA Walk”