How Do Family Ownership , Management , and Control Affect Firm Value ?

2004

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d3e0c722b4cd9125783ed90ed5e0cd2cabd4c973

Citations in the corpus

• Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private SMEs (2012, unknown): “…that private SMEs with multiple owners face a further type of agency problem in the form of potential principal-principal conflicts, especially in the emerging economy context (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 1 These studies indicate that over 90 % of SMEs in China are family-owned.”
• Resource-Based Theory and Corporate Diversification (2011, unknown): “For example, because the extent to which family ownership is susceptible to the agency problem is still not totally clear (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the impact of family involvement on diversification is worthy of future investigation.”
• Mixing Family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind Them (2008, unknown): “More recently, Perez-Gonzales (2002) and Villalonga and Amit (2004) show for U.S. firms that this negative performance effect is in large part related to the passing of active management and control from the founder to the descendants.”
• The Role of Family in Family Firms (2006, unknown): “Perez-Gonzalez (2004), Villalonga and Amit (2004) and Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (2000) show that the lower performance of family firms is in large part related to the passing of active management and control from the founder to his or her descendants.”
• Stewardship vs. Stagnation: An Empirical Comparison of Small Family and Non‐Family Businesses* (2007, unknown): “We should say that some proponents of the stagnation perspective take as objects of criticism large and venerable family firms, claiming that these are burdened by changeresistant family factions, owners with crony-like associations with governments, and owners who have become entrenched, exploitati”
• Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, unknown): “Family CEO: The good Agency theory suggests that there are inherent conflicts between shareholders and professional managers.”
• Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, unknown): “We control for sources of heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of management regime (Villalonga and Amit 2006).”
• The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance. Evidence from Continental Europe (2006, unknown): “Many papers highlight that founder-CEOs have a positive effect on corporate performance (McConnaughy et al., 1998; Palia and Ravid, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2003; Falenbrach, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2004).”
• Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, unknown): “Each side of this debate has a set of valid theoretical logic and empirical evidence in support of its view (De Vries, 1993; Villalonga and Amit, 2005).”