Mixing Family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind Them

By Marianne Bertrand, Simon Johnson, Krislert Samphantharak, Antoinette Schoar. 2008

558 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a25bdceb157d2973172fbd860eda8bb9bb7cdcab

Citations in the corpus

• Large Shareholder Diversification and Corporate Risk-Taking (2010, unknown): “Limited empirical evidence, showing that at least some large shareholders are well diversified, is found in the literature on business groups (Bertrand et al. 2008;Bertrand, Metha, and Mullainathan 2002 ; Faccio, Lang, and Young 2001 ; Khanna and Yafeh 2005 ; Morck 2005).”
• Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? (2007, unknown): “Bertrand et al. (2004) take a first step in addressing this issue when they treat the number of male offsprings as an endogenous outcome.”
• Capital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economy (2011, unknown): “See Bertrand et al. (2008) for the ‘‘quiet life view’’ of CEOs and Adams et al. (2005) for empirical evidence on the strong decision power of founder CEOs.”
• How Do CEOs See Their Roles? Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms (2013, unknown): “As such, our results are complementary to some of the recent work on differences in management practices across firms and countries (particularly Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007 and Bloom et al., 2012a), and also with recent work by Bandiera et al. (2012) on the time use of CEOs.”
• How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value? (2006, unknown): “(1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide evidence in support of Demsetz’s arguments. Three recent studies focus more narrowly on the effect of ownership in the hands of families and other large shareholders: Claessens et al. (2002), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003)”
• Does Family Control Matter? International Evidence from the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “…La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Claessens et al. 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002; Volpin 2002; Lins 2003; Durnev and Kim 2005; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Bertrand et al. 2008; Almeida et al. 2011; Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi 2010; Masulis, Pham, and Zein 2001; Franks et al. 2012). interest.”
• When does transitioning from family to professional management improve firm performance (2015, unknown): “Other studies find the opposite to be true, as attributed to nepotism, conflicting interests, and family legacy issues (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Bertrand et al., 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).”
• How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms (2011, unknown): “Because of the role played by family ties, personal objectives and conflicts on a firm's organization and governance (Bertrand et al., 2008; Bertrand and Shoar, 2006), the choice of appointing either a family or a professional CEO has acquired special meaning in family firms.”
• Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, unknown): “Asriskpreferencesare notinherited(Bertrand,Johnson,Samphantharak,& Schoar,2008),thiseffectislikelytoholdonlyfor founderCEOs,butnotforlater-generationfamilyCEOs (Cucculelli,LeBreton ‐ Miller, & Miller, 2014).”