The Role of Family in Family Firms

By Marianne Bertrand, Antoinette Schoar. 2006

1,365 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/251f1fc3af980fe5eaedc19b078de4c5016be628

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In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation (2013, neutral): “If managers who move across 9 Using exogenous managerial supply characteristics to identify the causal role of managerial selection on firm performance has been applied in the literature on family firms (e.g., Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) and Bertrand and Schoar (2006)).”
The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, neutral): “A substantial body of literature has documented the success of family firms in emerging markets that are characterized by weak and still developing institutional environments (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006).”
Economic and Technological Importance of Innovations in Large Family and Founder Firms (2013, background): “…prioritize keeping the business within their control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), providing careers and financial security for family members (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) and preserving family status in the local community (Berrone et al., 2010;…”
Mixing Family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind Them (2008, neutral): “The founder might feel compelled to let his sons manage the group firms irrespective of their ability because of personal preferences or cultural inheritance norms (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2006 ).”
The Mystery of Zero-Leverage Firms (2013, neutral): “and Bertrand and Schoar (2006) argue that family members can be altruistic and derive utility from passing on the family legacy and safeguarding the well being of other family members.”
Knowledge Combination and the Potential Advantages of Family Firms in Searching for Opportunities (2011, neutral): “For example, the distribution of human and social capital affects the availability of knowledge within a firm because these resources are repositories of a firm’s knowledge and are required for both discovery and exploitation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006).”
How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, neutral): “The goals of the business-owning family are often long-term (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Block, 2010; James, 1999; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) and may differ from those of nonfamily firms (Guzzo & Abbott, 1990; Harris, Martinez, & Ward, 1994; Lee & Rogoff, 1996; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992).”
Markets, Hierarchies, and Families: Toward a Transaction Cost Theory of the Family Firm (2010, neutral): “As a consequence of these factors, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) contend that politicians prefer to exchange ‘favors’ with family firms, which can become the basis for valuable bridging social capital for the firm.”