比較制度分析 = Towards a comparative institutional analysis

By 青木昌彦, 周黎安. 2001

277 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d28a24bc50e36ad60753335a73a92ddb779c426b

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Citations in the corpus

Institutions matter, but which ones? (2005, unknown): “15 Aoki (2001) points out that even in the US, venture capital financing of start-up firms has similar characteristics as in relational finance (as opposed to arm’s length finance).”
Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity? (2007, background): “An ‘institutional complementarity’ arises when there are interdependencies across domains; thus ‘market-supporting moral codes (first-party mechanism) and a just system of the rule of law (formal third-party mechanism) can be complementary’ (Aoki, 2001: 87).”
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants (2003, background): “Institutional configurations have various linkages , complementarities, and tensions (Aoki, 2001; Maurice et al., 1986).”
Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation (2010, background): “We do not believe that producer innovation will disappear, but we do expect it to become less pervasive and ubiquitous than was the case during most of the 20th century, and to be combined with user and open collaborative innovation in many settings.”
How User Innovations Become Commercial Products: A Theoretical Investigation and Case Study (2006, background): “On the one hand, tournaments are known to increase investment in activities that contribute to winning (Frank and Cook 1995, Aoki 2001).”
Measuring the knowledge base of regional innovation systems in Germany in terms of a Triple Helix dynamics, Research Policy (forthcoming). (2006, background): “The non-equilibrium dynamics of the knowledge-based economy can be expected to counteract the equilibrium-seeking mechanisms of the market and the quasi-equilibrium of redistribution by institutional policies (Aoki, 2001).”
Careers and Clusters: Analyzing the Career Network Dynamic of Biotechnology Clusters (2005, background): “We propose that institutional factors would shape the three attributes of career affiliation networks outlined above with this expectation formed in part on the basis of the large literature demonstrating that institutional factors impact the organization and human resource structures of firms (Aoki”
The Firm as Social Networks: An Organisational Perspective (2005, background): “My concern is not so much with the origin and growth of the firm per se, that has been fairly well theorised in evolutionary and institutional economics (see Aoki 2000; Hodgson 1994, 2000; Ménard 2000; Nielsen and Koch 2004; Penrose 1995; Williamson and Winter 1991).”
Good corporate governance in Nigeria: Antecedents, propositions and peculiarities (2015, background): “Orientations towards the antecedents of good corporate governance across varying national economies should therefore inculcate a broader perspective of institutional contingencies (Aoki, 2001; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Granapathi, 2007).”
Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm (2005, background): “2 There are numerous definitions of stakeholders in the governance research literature, based in part on the economic salience of these stakeholders (Aoki, 1984, 2001; Carroll, 1989; Preston, 1990; Hill and Jones, 1992; Hosseni and Brenner, 1992; Logsdon and Yuthas , 1997; Mitchell, Agle and Wood,…”
Comparing theories of institutional change (2009, background): “Aoki (2001) highlights the existence of strategic linkages and complementarities between institutions in different ‘domains’ of the economy – for example, between particular kinds of political systems, labor market institutions, and mechanisms of corporate governance.”
Dialogue on `Institutional complementarity and political economy` (2005, background): “‘Comparative Institutional Analysis’ stresses the same idea concerning the complementarity of keiretsu, employment stability and the main bank system in Japan (Aoki, 2001).”
The political economy of comparative corporate governance (2003, unknown): “…through ‘perfect’ capital, labour and product markets will lead to optimal economic outcomes (Albert, 1991; Amable et al ., 1997; Amable, 2000; Aoki, 2001; Dore, 1973; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Herrigel, 1995; Lazonick, 1990, 1991; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1996; Dore et al ., 1999; Nelson,…”
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? (2011, background): “Society’s institutions have to be studied from a holistic, systemic perspective (Aoki 2001).”
Where do transactions come from? Modularity, transactions, and the boundaries of firms (2007, background): “Hence corporations are institutions in the sense of Aoki (2001). Over the last 150 years, corporations have become the most common institutional form of business enterprise. Indeed, on this view, corporations can be seen as social artifacts designed for the purpose of encapsulating complex transfers”