Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

By Anthony Chemero. 2009

2,086 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c98c088a20855253a96c082ce4a6e08d3426f628

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Citations in the corpus

Playing together without communicating? A pre-reflective and enactive account of joint musical performance (2015, background): “Indeed, behaviour informs the intention and vice-versa, instantiating the self-regulative processes at the basis of the circular interplay with the environment (Chemero, 2009).”
Bringing forth mathematical concepts: signifying sensorimotor enactment in fields of promoted action (2014, background): “Meanwhile, alternative accounts of human behavior are being put forth that do away entirely with the assumption of mental content, including philosophers of cognitive science offering radical theory of embodiment (Chemero 2009; Hutto 2013) and cognitive developmental empiricists offering an action-o”
Musical creativity and the embodied mind (2018, background): “A key issue that differentiates these approaches is that the former relies on a notion of (internal) “representation” as the foundation for cognitive processes, while the latter does not (for more detailed accounts of the differences between these orientations see Barrett, 2011; Chemero, 2009).”
Artificial intelligence for education: Knowledge and its assessment in AI-enabled learning ecologies (2020, background): “While the comparison with the human brain is seductive, the laborious, procedural sequencing of binary calculation is nothing like the simultaneous neurochemistry of the embodied, environ-ment-sensing brain (Chemero, 2009; Dreyfus, 1992; Searle, 2014).”
A Rich Landscape of Affordances (2014, background): ““Dispositions,” he tells us, “never fail; they simply are or are not in the appropriate circumstances to become manifest” (Chemero, 2009, p. 145).”
The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering (2010, background): “There remain of course substantial residual questions about what representations might be within a distributed cognition framework (Chemero 2009; Steiner 2010).”
Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition (2010, background): “Whereas, some enactivists are much more radical, calling for the replacement of cognitivism and arguing that there is no need at all for mental representations in cognitive explanations (Chemero 2009) or that they will have a very limited and reduced role (Hutto 2008).”
Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency (2012, background): “exists even if it is not perceived (Chemero, 2009; Heft, 2001; Michaels, 2003).”
The Nature of Dynamical Explanation* (2011, methodology): “For further discussion of the HKB model, see Kelso (1995), van Gelder (1998), Walmsley (2008), Chemero (2009). associate Kelso’s brand of dynamicism with the principles of coveringlaw explanation, and Walmsley recently invoked the HKB model to defend the general claim that “the explanatory goal of…”