The Governance of the New Enterprise

By Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales. 2000

418 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c646ba563180a4dcce72551b35d4ab218459947b

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Citations in the corpus

The Trade-Off Between Financial Resources and Agency Costs in the Family Business: An Exploratory Study (2007, background): “Afamilybusinesscanbeseenasanexusof contracts (Hill & Jones, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) between co-specialized resource owners (Rajan & Zingales, 2000) who are linked through a special contractualstructurethatcombineseconomicrelations and family ones.”
Innovations and the role of complementarities in a strategic theory of the firm (2007, neutral): “According to Rajan and Zingales (2000), complementary assets provide the economic link that 11 The resource-based view of strategy has identified the same appropriation problem in more static settings (Peteraf, 1993).”
The Effects of Business Accelerators on Venture Performance: Evidence from Start-Up Chile (2017, background): “First, applicant start-ups are predominantly from the “new economy,” for which the necessary levels of physical capital stock to generate positive returns are generally low (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2000).”
Slack Resources and the Rent-Generating Potential of Firm-Specific Knowledge (2016, background): “However, when a greater number of knowledge employees (more than necessary) make specialized investments (i.e., there is ample human resource slack), each employee is less likely to be indispensable to the firm (Glick & Feuer, 1984; Rajan & Zingales, 2000; Rock & Wachter, 1999).”
Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Reputation and Financial Performance: A Survey of the Literature (2003, background): “In the authors’ opinion, it is in the contractual view (Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that corporate reputation finds an essential justification (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Devine and Halpern, 2001).”
Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s (2001, positive): “Improved information technology, including the Internet, have made access to financial capital easier and reduced the power of physical assets relative to human capital (Rajan and Zingales, 2000).”
Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mergers of Equals” (2004, background): “…control over firm resources that are valuable to the acquiring firm (e.g. CEOs with control over key managers or customers, or possibly regulatory authorities) (Rajan and Zingales, 2000).10 Two theoretical papers give insight into the nature of the bargaining between CEOs in merger negotiations.”
Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s (2001, positive): “Improved information technology, including the Internet, have made access to financial capital easier and reduced the power of physical assets relative to human capital ( Rajan and Zingales, 2000 ).”
Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Reputation: Two Interwoven Perspectives (2007, methodology): “The development of the Theory of the Firm ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ; Freeman, 1984 ; Clarkson, 1995 ; Hill and Jones, 1992 ; Rajan and Zingales, 1998 ) has broadened the description of the fi rm to include every stakeholder.”
Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance (2001, background): “control of their suppliers and moved towards looser forms of collaboration, and that specialized human capital has become more important and also more mobile (e.g., Zingales, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2000).”
Do employee-friendly firms invest more efficiently? Evidence from labor investment efficiency (2020, positive): “The human capital theory of corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales, 2000, 1998; Zingales, 2000) also suggests that the focus of corporate governance for modern firms should shift from a focus on agency problems between managers and shareholders to explore treatment of the labor force, an…”
Centralization of franchising networks: evidence from the Austrian franchise sector (2004, background): “The person who has intangible knowledge assets that generates the residual surplus should have the residual decision rights to maximize the residual income (Rajan and Zingales, 2000).”
Varieties of Capitalism and institutional comparative advantage: A test and reinterpretation (2016, background): “Employee skills and organizational capabilities based upon them are essential for comparative advantage during times of discontinuous change (Aoki & Jackson, 2008; Rajan & Zingales, 2000).”
Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and Corporate Innovation (2015, positive): “Therefore, the deferral feature of employee stock options can effectively direct employees‟ attention to the firm‟s long-term success and encourage employees‟ long-term human capital investment in innovation (Rajan and Zingales 2000).”