Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s

By Bengt R. Holmstrom, Steven N. Kaplan. 2001

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1f21582db699466cbf23da65b9c87bfcfc3d62fa

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Citations in the corpus

Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation (2007, background): “Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that the 1980- style deals are not necessary anymore, because the focus on shareholder value has been institutionalized by corporations since.”
CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired? (2006, background): “While this issue is important in its own right, it is of particular interest in light of the decline in hostile takeover activity in recent years (Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)).”
Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-financial corporate sector:A theoretical and empirical investigation on the US economy: 1973–2003 (2008, background): “And in the 1990s, stock options began to play a significant, if not dominant, role in corporate governance Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001).”
Capital Reallocation and Liquidity (2006, unknown): “12See Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Holmström and Kaplan (2001) for recent surveys. firms are actually more likely to reallocate capital by selling part of their property, plant and equipment.”
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “…occupied by officers of the firm fell from 0.42 in 1950 to 0.18 in 1990.20 More generally, proxy fights and takeovers were rare prior to the 1980s (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001), boards of directors have become smaller and more independent since mid-century (Lehn, Patro, and Zaho 2003), and both the…”
Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much (2008, unknown): “Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001, 2003) link the rise of compensation value to the rise in stock-based compensation following the “leveraged buyout revolution” of the 1980s.”
The Political Economy of Finance (2001, unknown): “Protection of minority shareholders (Pagano and Volpin, 2000) Codetermination (Pistor, 1999) Takeover restrictions (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001) Branching restrictions (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) Bank supervision (Kroszner and Strahan, 2000) Generalized moratoria and bailouts (Bolton and Rosenthal,…”
Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders? (2005, background): “2 Research on antitakeover provisions can also be found in Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), Bhagat and Romano (2001), Comment and Schwert (1995), and Karpoff and Malatesta (1989).”
Capital Investments and Stock Returns (2003, background): “In a paper that discusses the rise and fall of hostile takeovers since the 1980s, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) finds that the number of leverage buyouts (LBOs) and hostile takeovers increased substantially in the 1984 to 1990 period.”
Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (2008, unknown): “Merging firms with strong internal governance tend to implement a thorough and effective due diligence process; see Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) for a review of governance and M&A activities.”