Governance and the Financial Crisis

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Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies (2011, background): “Adams (2009a) finds that bank boards are larger and more independent than non-financial firms in the Riskmetrics database of S&P 1500 firms from 1996-2007.”
Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis (2012, unknown): “Adams and Mehran (2003) find that bank holding companies have on average larger boards of directors than manufacturing firms.”
Connecting the Dots – Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle (2015, unknown): “For example, after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, directors in the US have had greater incentives to monitor due to higher risks of large fines and prison sentences in the case of accounting crimes (Adams, 2012).”
Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, background): “It is widely believed that these externalities are also the result of ineffective monitoring mechanisms stemming from bank internal governance (Adams, 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014; OECD, 2010).”
The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform Better? (2012, unknown): “A further difficulty is that, as noted by Adams and Mehran (2003) for the US, regulation typically affects governance more for financial institutions than it does for other firms.”