Corporate Governance

By David C. Krehnke. Information Security Management Handbook, 6th ed., 2007

2,113 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Do socially responsible investment indexes outperform conventional indexes? (2012, unknown): “Furthermore, critics of CSR argue that focusing on stakeholder value (including the environment) is a second-best optimum because managerial incentive problems such as agency costs are incorporated in a stakeholder’s framework (Tirole, 2001).”
Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence (2007, unknown): “See Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Tirole (2001) and Becht et al. (2003) for more detailed reviews of corporate governance mechanisms.”
Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q as a Measure of Organizational Performance (2018, unknown): “…dependency theory, Boards help companies improve their performance by reducing their dependence on the external environment and contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), thereby lowering their transaction costs (Williamson, 1984) which may fundamentally assist their survival (Singh et al., 1986).”
Corporate Governance Quality: Trends and Real Effects (2006, unknown): “Zingales, Luigi, 1998, “Corporate Governance,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, ed. by P. Newman (New York, NY: Macmillan).”
Ethnic and Gender Diversity in Boards of Directors and Their Relevance to Financial Performance of Malaysian Companies (2009, background): “Fundamentally, the resource dependence theory proposed that corporate boards are a mechanism for managing external dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1987), reducing environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972) and reducing the transaction costs associated with environmental interdependency (Williamson,”
Analyst Coverage, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Firm Risk (2014, background): “Similarly, Yu (2008) views the potential role of analysts as an additional monitoring mechanism and maintains that analyst coverage imposes discipline on misbehaving managers and helps align managers with shareholders, thus improving managerial incentives to undertake more optimal policies. Berk & D”
Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting (2010, background): “3 See Heard and Sherman (1987), McGurn (1989), and Monks and Minow (2003) for further details about the mechanics of proxy voting and an overview of vote confidentiality issues.”
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Asia (2005, unknown): “As a result, perhaps excepting India which has witnessed some improvements in corporate governance, all the countries share what is often regarded as an Asian characteristic of “weak institutions and poor property rights” (Mallin, 2004, p. 173; see also Rodan, 2002).”
The Economics and Politics of Corporate Social Performance (2011, unknown): “…model that firms with higher CSP have a weaker incentive to resist social pressure than do firms with lower CSP.15 Social pressure then should be positively related 13 Tirole (2001) considers stakeholder theory from the perspective of corporate governance, focusing on incentive and control issues.”
Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests (2012, background): “On the other side is the relatively new stakeholding approach that views the corporation as a locus of responsibility in relation to wider stakeholders’ interests rather than merely in relation to shareholders’ wealth (Tirole, 2001).”
How Do CEOs See Their Roles? Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms (2013, unknown): “See, for example, Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2011) or Tirole (2001); see Morck and Yeung (2004) for some of the disadvantages of such a society.”
Corporate social responsibility and corporate performance: evidence from a panel of US listed companies (2005, unknown): “On this line, Tirole (2001) argues that the concept of stakeholder value recognizes that corporate activity may create negative externalities that need to be counterbalanced, either by institutional rules or by corporations themselves.”