Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting

By Gregor Matvos, Michael Ostrovsky. 2010

179 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bf5a4ebea1d13eb67f359192e8ea40dadde0091c

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Citations in the corpus

• Cross-Ownership, Returns and Voting in Mergers (2008, unknown): “’’ This is in line with the findings of Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008), who show that a large heterogeneity exists among funds in terms of their propensity to oppose the management in board of director elections and that a large fraction of funds votes ‘‘for’’ management-recommended directors 100% of t”
• Ties that Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism (2016, unknown): “It is related to an analogous measure in Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010), which instead averages with respect to proposals and firms.”
• Are Mutual Funds Active Voters (2015, unknown): “Following Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010), we match the ISS data to the EDGAR data based on fund and family name, and then match via ticker to the CRSP mutual fund database.”
• The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design (2016, unknown): “The results of the regression analysis con…rm the absence of discontinuity in votes at any conventional level of signi…cance and are omitted for brevity.”
• Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (2012, background): “For example, a number of papers examine whether mutual funds suffer from agency costs of monitoring and conflicts of interest when casting proxy votes in director elections (Rothberg and Lilian 2006; Davis and Kim 2007; Matvos and Ostrovsky 2010).”
• Institutional investor cliques and governance (2019, unknown): “McCahery et al. (2016) find that institutions view voting as an engagement mechanism that directly affects governance.”