Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation

By Simon Gächter, Armin Falk. Social Science Research Network, 2002

405 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. Many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a ‘reciprocity-compatible’ contract enforcement device.

Subfields: Demography, Information Systems and Management, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/41bdf1a62bda3872a42f889636e17065175a5c15

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Armin Falk
  3. Klaus M. Schmidt
  4. Simon Gächter
  5. Urs Fischbacher
  6. David Huffman
  7. Thomas J. Dohmen
  8. Lorenz F. Goette

In Information Systems and Management

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Klaus M. Schmidt
  3. L. Schechter
  4. Frederico Finan
  5. Urs Fischbacher
  6. Luca Stanca
  7. C. Schaik
  8. Peter M. Kappeler

In Safety Research

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Armin Falk
  3. Simon Gächter
  4. Urs Fischbacher
  5. Klaus M. Schmidt
  6. Samuel Bowles
  7. Herbert Gintis
  8. Peter M. Kappeler

Citations in the corpus