Agency Problems in Diverse Contexts: A Global Perspective

By Luis R. Gómez-Mejía, Robert M. Wiseman, B. J. Dykes. 2005

109 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b2ef80002a139a3c184ebd75340723f95df8294c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Marc van Essen
2. P. Duran
3. Mike W. Peng
4. Sabrina F. Saleh
5. Canan C. Mutlu
6. T. Buck
7. A. Bruce
8. Brian G. M. Main

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Mike W. Peng
2. P. Duran
3. Marc van Essen
4. Brian G. M. Main
5. T. Buck
6. Julie Juan Li
7. Yadong Luo
8. Kevin Zheng Zhou

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis (2018, background): “Second, the key assumptions of standard corporate governance mechanisms regarding self-interested agents and goal conflicts may not hold in contexts characterized by relationship-based governance regimes (Bruce et al., 2005; Chua et al., 2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Luen et al., 2013).”
• Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe (2005, background): “Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005) argue that the beauty of agency theory is the way in which it abstracts from the institutional context while still being flexible enough to fit into a variety of social settings.”