Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards

By Charu G. Raheja. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2005

1,307 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b092e69fdc59100561613f0cd7ef30d6d6c1cb38

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Citations in the corpus

Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs (2013, background): “24See Adams and Ferreira (2007), Baker and Gompers (2003), Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007), Harris and Raviv (2006), Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), Raheja (2005), and Song and Thakor (2006).”
Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from New Zealand (2011, background): “For example, board size and composition reflects a trade-off between specific benefits of monitoring and costs of such monitoring (Raheja, 2005).”
When Are Outside Directors Effective (2010, neutral): “…1983; Jensen, 1993).1 Empirically, it is notoriously difficult to find reliable evidence that outside directors matter at all for performance, with most studies finding small, statistically insignificant correlations (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Fields and Keys, 2003).”
Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance (2008, background): “…Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda (2006) show that larger boards are more desirable for not-for-profit organizations that pursue more objectives, and Raheja (2005) suggests that because optimal board size is a function of the directors’ and the firm’s characteristics, a large board may be optimal…”
Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies (2011, background): “A logical corollary to this idea is that the alignment of incentives and 1 Raheja (2005), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), and Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2008) all predict that insiderdominated boards may have some competitive advantages over boards consisting principally of disinterested…”
Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance (2007, methodology): “Our choice of instruments is based on previous theoretical and empirical studies in the literature concerning the determinants of boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Linck et al., 2005; Raheja, 2005).”
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, background): “Yet, these directors often face limited access to firm-specific information and high costs in assessing its reliability, which reduces their monitoring incentives and effectiveness (Jensen, 1993; Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferriera, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011).”
Evidence on the Role of Accounting Conservatism in Monitoring Managers' Investment Decisions (2011, background): “4 Recent theoretical work on boards includes Gillette et al. (2003), Harris and Raviv (2008), Raheja (2005), and Adams and Ferreira (2007).”
The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis (2007, methodology): “These ideas are formalized and expanded in a theoretical model of board structure developed by Raheja (2004). In this model, the net benefits of external monitoring increase with managers' opportunities to consume private benefits, but decrease with the cost of monitoring.”