When Are Outside Directors Effective

By R. Duchin, John G. Matsusaka, O. Ozbas. 2010

1,009 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cab9af42a119fa166165e4545a096f9417d59727

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Citations in the corpus

Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, methodology): “However, using the same natural experiment, Duchin et al (2010) finds that board independence improves firm performance for firms with low information costs, but reduces firm performance for firms with high Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021468 34 information costs.”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, positive): “Our second instrument is the industry-level information acquisition cost variable of Duchin et al. (2010).”
Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Risk (2016, positive): “Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) report that independent directors offer better advice, but Duchin et al. (2010) and Coles et al. (2008) find that operating performance only benefits from the advice of outside directors in cases where it is relatively easier for them to learn more about the firm.”
The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation (2012, positive): “Other papers examine the effect of regulatory changes to boards due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010), the Cadbury Committee Report in the UK (Dahya and McConnell, 2007), and the 1976 German codetermination law (Petry, 2009).”
Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, positive): “Duchin et al. (2010) find that firm performance increases when outsiders are added to the board only when the cost of information acquisition is low.”
Gender diversity and firm performance: evidence from India and Singapore (2019, background): “A positive relationship between board independence and firm value is predicted (and empirically supported; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas 2010; Setia-Atmaja 2009).”
Forced Board Changes: Evidence from Norway (2011, neutral): “Outside directors, largely independent from the CEO, should be in a better position to monitor the same CEO on behalf of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) show that shareholders value the very independence of an outside director, over and”
It’s who you know that counts: Board connectedness and CSR performance (2020, positive): “Duchin et al. (2010) suggest that independent directors are less effective in improving corporate governance of the firms when information acquisition costs are high.”
Board Connections and M&A Transactions (2012, background): “Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) argue that outside directors are more effective when the cost of acquiring information is lower.”
Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, methodology): “Six use legal shocks – SOX (Duchin et al., 2010; Iliev, 2010); US state laws (Adams and Santos, 2006); Swedish pension reform (Giannetti and Laeven, 2009); US tax rules (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009), and the U.S. Homeland Investment Act (Dharmapala et al., 2011).”
Corporate Governance and Audit Report Lag in Malaysia (2010, neutral): “Because of their high degree of impartiality, they are believed to be willing to stand up to the CEO to protect the interests of all shareholders (Duchin, Matsusaka & Ozbas, 2010).”
Board of Directors’ Composition and Capital Structure (2014, neutral): “In this sense, a board of directors where the chairman of the board is also the CEO should be less independent because of high concentration of power and adverse conditions for outsiders to effectively monitor the executive members (Coles et al., 2008; Duchin et al., 2010).”
Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity (2016, methodology): “…that when the CEO is also the Board Chair, power is highly concentrated and independent directors are less able to effectively monitor executives (Yermack 1996; Carter et al. 2003; Coles et al. 2008; Duchin et al. 2010) and there are negative impacts on firm performance (Bhagat and Bolton 2008).”
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production (2015, positive): “These findings also enrich our understanding of how institutions can enhance monitoring capabilities by increasing firm transparency (Duchin et al., 2010).”