Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs
By Adam Kolasinski, Xu Li. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2013
144 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/48a6ad9e713b7691056cf0b133b437a5335cf381
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Ulrike Malmendier
- Geoffrey A. Tate
- Clemens A. Otto
- Dorota Skała
- N. Travlos
- G. Alexandridis
- Ahsan Habib
- Roland Bénabou
In Finance
- Ulrike Malmendier
- Geoffrey A. Tate
- Clemens A. Otto
- Dorota Skała
- N. Travlos
- G. Alexandridis
- Ahsan Habib
- Roland Bénabou
Citations in the corpus
- Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, unknown): “Kolasinski and Li (2013) provide some consistent evidence, suggesting that a strong independent board reduces the likelihood that an overconfident manager undertakes an acquisition.”
- Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence (2015, background): “Recent work has begun to look seriously at how and when governance can mitigate managerial biases (Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda 2015b; Kolasinski and Li 2013), which seems to offer a promising direction for additional research.”
- Are Overconfident CEOs Better Leaders? Evidence from Stakeholder Commitments (2017, unknown): “We tackle this issue by following the approach in Kolasinski and Li (2013) to create a measure of CEO overconfidence based on action/activity.”