The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis

By Audra L. Boone, Laura Casares Field, Jonathan M. Karpoff, Charu G. Raheja. 2007

1,713 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a1803a53472a36a3ce4d7c4ad662ac06531feca0

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Citations in the corpus

Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation around the World (2013, neutral): “, Coates (2009), Bebchuk, Friedman, and Friedman (2007), Davis (2007), Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2005)).”
Boards, CEOS, and Surviving a Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Internet Shakeout (2011, background): “Prior research has documented, for example, that governance mechanisms change as firms go through different stages in their life cycles, so that as firms grow and become more complex, they tend to increase both the size and independence of their boards (Boone et al., 2007).”
Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China (2012, background): “Since the Sarbanes Oxley (Sox) Act mandates that the audit committees for the boards of directors of listed companies have a majority of independent members, corporate board 9 structures receive much attention from researchers of late (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2008;).”
The influence of CEO demographic characteristics on corporate risk-taking: evidence from Chinese IPOs (2016, background): “We agree with Boone et al. (2007) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) that there are several advantages of studying IPOs’ board characteristics.”
Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies (2013, result): “This results can add to the prior evidence, provided by a growing stream of research that casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that smaller, more independent boards are the preferable governance structure (Coles et al. 2008; Boone et al. 2007; Lynck et al. 2008; Larmou and Vafeas 2010).”
Evidence on the Role of Accounting Conservatism in Monitoring Managers' Investment Decisions (2011, background): “Directors also advise managers on proposed strategies, provide outside expertise, and monitor the progress of major projects (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008).4 To effectively monitor and advise managers, directors (particularly outside directors) need verifiable…”
Reputation concerns of independent directors: : Evidence from individual director voting (2015, neutral): “3 could reflect the optimization of individual firms under different parameters rather than a causal relation resulting from the actions of directors (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Boone et al. 2007; Denis, Denis, and Walker 2012). A related issue, highlighted by Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), ”
CEO Compensation and Board Structure (2009, neutral): “Indeed, empirical evidence supports the notion that optimal board structure differs across firms (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Linck, Netter, and Young (2007), Coles, Naveen, and Naveen (2008), Boone et al. (2007), Wintoki (2007), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)).”