Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence

By W. Schulze, M. Lubatkin, Richard N. Dino, Ann Buchholtz. 2001

2,330 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a253a34679da78829668972dac172def77b94e92

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Citations in the corpus

How does family control influence firm strategy and performance? A meta-analysis of us publicly listed firms (2015, methodology): “These findings suggest that while theories like the RBV may best explain the behavior and performance of founder-led FFs, theories such as PP agency theory (Young et al., 2008) and the work of Schulze et al. (2001) on asymmetric familial altruism may be more applicable to successor-led FFs.”
The Heterogeneity of Family Firms in CSR Engagement (2014, result): “Therefore, our results are partly in accordance with the arguments against altruistic motives (e.g., Schulze et al., 2001), except that the self-interest of family CEOs is not their personal satisfaction or the satisfaction of the family, but firm survival.”
How Firms Respond to Mandatory Information Disclosure (2012, positive): “The absence of stock price concerns renders private firms less sensitive to external pressure to improve following disclosure of performance information (Schulze et al., 2001).”
Markets, Hierarchies, and Families: Toward a Transaction Cost Theory of the Family Firm (2010, neutral): “Such transactions governed by norms of reciprocity promote the exchange of idiosyncratic resource bundles (Schulze et al., 2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) with inexact accounting (Redding, 1990) and particularistic asset valuations (Luo & Chung, 2005).”
Organizational Virtue Orientation and Family Firms (2011, background): “Criticisms of family firms are generally based on concerns about destructive nepotism (Schulze et al., 2001), political rent seeking (Morck & Yeung, 2003), exploitation of minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), amoral familism (Dyer, 2006), and high levels of interpersonal conflict…”
Filling the institutional void: The social behavior and performance of family vs non-family technology firms in emerging markets (2009, background): “Issues of favoritism, nepotism, discrimination against non-family managers, and disregard for merit are among these shortcomings (for reviews of these well-known criticisms see Miller, Steier, & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Morck et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2001; Singell, 1997).”
CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective (2006, background): “To mitigate agency threats to firm performance, most family firms offer pay incentives and use other formal monitoring mechanisms (Schulze et al., 2001) rather than CEO replacement.”
Stewardship Theory: Realism, Relevance, and Family Firm Governance (2019, background): “As Schulze et al. (2001) point out, the problem of aligning the economic interests of owners (e.g., whether to use cash flows for reinvestment or to pay dividends) is not trivial but the problem of aligning noneconomic interests is even more challenging, partially because such interests are not…”
Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-controlled Firms: Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills (2007, background): “Schulze et al. (2001) estimated that family influence is pervasive among the largest U.S. firms.”
Incumbents’ Attitude Toward Intrafamily Succession (2016, background): “Besides, handing the leadership of the business that has been financially successful under family leadership to the next generation of family members will also satisfy the incumbent’s altruistic motivation to do something good for her or his children (Schulze et al., 2001).”