Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing

By Ashish Arora, Marco Ceccagnoli. Management Sciences, 2006

539 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/971e5b2c7fe734aeac37a846ac4a82cee9a0e6ee

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management of Technology and Innovation

Citations in the corpus

How SMEs exploit their intellectual property assets: evidence from survey data (2011, unknown): “Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Gambardella et al. 2007; Motohashi 2008). One of the reasons often put forward relates to the complementary assets required to commercialize a new technology (such as manufacturing and marketing capabilities): small firms generally lack such assets and therefore prefer lic”
Appropriability, Preemption, and Firm Performance (2009, unknown): “Indeed, the patenting choice depends on the net benefits from patenting, which are in turn empirically captured by the measure of patent effectiveness (Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen, 2008; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006).”
How Do Social Defenses Work? A Resource-Dependence Lens on Technology Ventures, Venture Capital Investors, and Corporate Relationships (2014, methodology): “These data have been used extensively in prior studies and are considered the primary source on comparative appropriability (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gulati & Singh, 1998).”
The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing (2006, background): “Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) analyze how patent effectiveness affects a firm’s patenting behavior and its propensity to license.”
Cocreation of Value in a Platform Ecosystem: The Case of Enterprise Software (2012, background): “Appropriability will also be affected by the ownership and strength of specialized downstream capabilities (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel 2008; Gans and Stern 2003; Rothaermel and Hill 2005; Teece 1986).”
The market for patents in Europe (2007, methodology): “Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) also discuss this point and they verify it empirically.”
How Firms Capture Value From Their Innovations (2013, background): “For example, recent work has examined the simultaneous use of patents and secrecy (Arora, 1997; Cohen & Klepper, 1996) and of patents and owning specialized complementary assets (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Clarkson & Toh, 2010; Gans & Stern, 2003; Ziedonis, 2004) as value capture strategies.”
On sharks, trolls, and their patent prey—Unrealistic damage awards and firms’ strategies of “being infringed” (2007, background): “…and Langinier, 2002; Bessen and Meurer, in press) and managerial aspects of patent licensing (e.g. Agrawal and Garlappi, 2002; Arora et al., 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006) the literature does not seem to provide conclusive answers to these pressing questions. and the English High Court, early…”
The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics (2008, background): “Although patents may facilitate contracting at the margin (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Gans et al. 2002), the general picture of markets for technology may be one where small firms and independent inventors have difficulty capturing the value of their inventions.”
Inventors and invention processes in Europe: Results from the PatVal-EU survey (2007, unknown): “36 (2007) 1107–1127 Cohen et al., 2000; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006).”
Discontinuities, competition, and cooperation: Coopetitive dynamics between incumbents and entrants (2018, unknown): “market their biotechnology inventions (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006).”
Show Me the Right Stuff: Signals for High Tech Startups (2013, unknown): “…from practicing their inventions, facilitating licensing to interested parties or by increasing the startup’s bargaining position in negotiations with other patent holders or established firms with complementary assets (Cohen et al., 2000; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; and Gans et al., 2002).”