Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and its Role in Managerial Compensation

By Rangarajan K. Sundaram, David Yermack. 2006

586 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9226746e49257cc270ae7cb74d1043f4ad81bd20

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Citations in the corpus

Capital structure, executive compensation, and investment efficiency (2013, methodology): “While it is hypothetically possible an executive can receive a pension benefit indefinitely, the mortality projections of the Social Security administration end at 119 years, so K is for practical purposes set at 120 following Sundaram and Yermack (2007).”
The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management (2016, unknown): “To get around this difficulty we exploit the fact that only defined benefit pension plans affect CEO risk-taking incentives (see Sundaram and Yermack (2007)).”
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay (2011, unknown): “companies in the 1996–2002 period, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that the mean annual”
Fair Value Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient Earnings Management Tool with Compensation Side-Benefits (2010, methodology): “We control for heteroskedasticity and possible correlation of the residuals within firm clusters using Rogers standard errors (Petersen, 2009).16 16 Recent papers using this technique include Sundaram and Yermack (2007), Caramanis and Lennox (2008), and Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2008).”
Calculation of Compensation Incentives and Firm-Related Wealth Using Execucomp: Data, Program, and Explanation (2013, unknown): “This measure is the same as the “inside equity” measure that is used in Sundaram and Yermack (1997). The user can readily use our data to calculate inside debt-equity ratio as in Sundaram and Yermack, because post-2006, firms have to report both the present value of pension benefits as well as the p”
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There (2013, background): “24 See, for example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007); Edmans and Liu (2011); Edmans, “How to Fix Executive Compensation,” Wall Street Journal (2012).”
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, background): “The finding complements the recent finance literature over the proposition that inside debt reduces agency cost of debt and contributes to efficient executive compensation contracting (e.g., Bushman and Smith 2001; Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Wei and Yermack 2011; Edmans and Liu 2011).”
Executive Compensation and Incentives (2006, background): “…such as use of aircraft and chauffeur drivers are predominantly awarded to executives who stand to benefit the most from free time.65 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argued that defined benefit pension plans (which are a fixed claim on the firm similar to salary) can be seen as a risk-reducing form…”
A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure (2011, unknown): “I now discuss these assumptions by relating them to ‘‘inside debt’’ investigated in Sundaram and Yermack (2007). Inside debt.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “In their absence, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) estimate annual increases in pension values to be approximately 10% of total pay for Fortune 500 CEOs.”
Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (2010, unknown): “Sundaram and Yermack (2007) estimate the average change in pension value is 10% of total compensation (TDC1) for Fortune 500 CEOs from 1996 to 2002.”
Inside Debt and Mergers and Acquisitions (2014, unknown): “7 findings hold when I follow Sundaram and Yermack (2007) in estimating inside debt for 2005 and expand the M&A sample to additionally include acquisitions in the year 2006.”