The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality

By G. He. 2015

143 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This study investigates the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality. I find that higher CEO inside debt holdings are associated with lower abnormal accruals, higher accruals quality, a lower likelihood of an earnings misstatement, and a lower incidence of earnings benchmark beating, suggesting that CEO inside debt promotes high financial reporting quality. Additional analyses reveal that (1) CEO inside debt holdings reduce firm-specific stock price crash risk, and that (2) auditors are less likely to report a material internal control weakness for firms that have large CEO inside debt.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e1f679fab558ddaf220e95b6acbb352e51ea014b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Hichem Khlif
2. D. Hay
3. K. Chalmers
4. K. Hussainey

In Strategy and Management

1. Hichem Khlif
2. D. Hay
3. K. Chalmers
4. K. Hussainey

Citations in the corpus

• Internal control in accounting research: A review (2019, background): “2 He (2015) explores the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on IC quality, as proxied by the disclosures of IC deficiencies under SOX 404, in the US setting.”
• Stock price crash risk: review of the empirical literature (2018, unknown): “He (2015) investigates the impact of another form of compensation: CEO inside debt.”