Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
By Kevin J. Murphy. 2013
600 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/517e897e99908d57bdf1bf00407da00a41999d5a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Pedro Matos
- Nuno Fernandes
- A. Cobb
- Kevin J. Murphy
- Ernst Maug
- Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
- Florens Focke
Citations in the corpus
- Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence (2012, background): “Murphy (2012) tries to reconcile these various paradigms, focusing on the role of government intervention and concluding that – in introducing plans that tie pay more strongly to performance as demanded by shareholders – directors routinely agree to pay more than necessary to compensate for the…”
- Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, neutral): “2 The literature on inside blockholders is covered by reviews of CEO compensation, such as Murphy (1999, 2013), Edmans & Gabaix (2009) (2014) Intervention encompasses any action that an investor can undertake to improve firm value but that is costly to the investor.”
- Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation around the World (2013, neutral): “CIQ also provides information on the 9 See Ferri (2013) for a review of evidence on SoP laws’ effects.”
- How Firms Shape Income Inequality: Stakeholder Power, Executive Decision Making, and the Structuring of Employment Relationships (2015, background): “In fact, many of the more generous executive compensation packages have been the result of contracts negotiated with external candidates at the time of hire, not deals reached with incumbents (Murphy, 2013).”
- Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic (2020, neutral): “Research also suggests that the structure of each firm’s board of directors ( Adams et al., 2010 ) and executive compensation policies ( Murphy, 2013 ; Rau, 2015 ) can shape corporate behavior and valuations.”
- The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation (2017, background): “…question in recent years, for example by analyzing the market for CEO talent (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013)), or by identifying the importance of corporate governance as a factor that explains pay levels (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; see also the surveys 4 by Murphy 1999, 2013; Frydman and Jenter 2010).”
- Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “25 Disclosure has improved markedly in recent years (Murphy, 2013).”
- Managerial Risk Taking (2016, neutral): “S. CEOs or differences in measurement (Murphy, 2012).”
- Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “The literature on inside blockholders is covered by 5 reviews of CEO compensation, such as Frydman and Jenter (2010), Murphy (2013), Edmans and Gabaix (2016), and Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter (2017).”
- Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking (2015, background): “Stock options are a fundamental component of US executive compensation packages (Murphy, 2013).”