Agents With and Without Principals

By Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan. 2000

209 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/920af218b9f30bc5ded72b3f5f9af5a3b9d31d16

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Citations in the corpus

The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (2012, background): “…non-information based channels, such as the granting of political favors (e.g., Faccio (2006), 1 See, for example, Yermack (1996), Conyon (1997), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Hartzell and Starks (2003), and Yermack (2004).”
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, background): “Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find CEO pay for luck is significantly lower if there is a large shareholder.”
Threshold Regression With a Threshold Boundary (2020, background): “Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) discussed a positive correlation between larger firms and poorer governance, while poorer governance indicates more vulnerable to skimming from executives (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).”
Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, unknown): “This measure captures the incentives of shareholders to intervene and monitor managerial actions (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000, 2001).”
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are (2001, result): “Motivated by practitioners such as Crystal [1991], we propose an alternative, skimming, which can explain these results [Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000a].”
Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More (2009, unknown): “Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001) report evidence of a “skimming model” in which CEOs working for poorly governed firms are able to pay themselves higher wages.”
Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws ☆ (2012, background): “…antitakeover laws led to a reduction in the equity ownership of officers and directors (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2004), changes in managerial pay (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999, 2000; Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009), a reduction in firm leverage (Garvey and Hanka, 1999), a decline in firm…”
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, methodology): “This is consistent with the skimming view of executive compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000, 2001).15 To formalize the idea that common owners have weak incentives to undertake active governance decisions because being passive is sufficient, consider the following variant of our model.”
CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk-taking (2011, unknown): “Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011) demonstrate important roles blockholders and institutional investors play in shaping corporate governance.”