Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are

By Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan. 2001

1,700 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a4cf0f607248077a0a2d0daf127b731341e784f4

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Citations in the corpus

Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats (2005, neutral): “This dramatically increased the responsiveness of top managers’ compensation to stock prices.”
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “21 For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that executives in corporations with weak corporate governance are remunerated for lucky outcomes.”
Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition (2009, neutral): “The rent-extraction argument (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) says that the change in incentives can be driven by rent extraction, camouflaged in the variable component of pay, so that executives appear to get paid for luck.”
CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, positive): “1) is based on the argument that rent seeking behavior on the part of the CEO is more likely to occur in firms with poor governance structures because, in such firms, the CEO is likely to have more power and influence over financial reporting (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan [2001]).”
Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (2006, neutral): “See, e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Harvey and Shrieves (2001), Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002), and Hartzell and Starks (2003) for the United States; Conyon (1997), Cosh and Hugh (1997), and Cragg and Dyck (2003) for…”
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003, background): “Similarly, cash compensation increases when firm profits rise for reasons that clearly have nothing to do with managers’ efforts (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)).”
How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS (2006, result): “Unfortunately, these results are not directly comparable because the sample in Mikkelsen and Partch consists of smaller firms.”