Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More

By Henrik Cronqvist, F. Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd, Jonas Vlachos. 2009

379 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea062e3b2eee9fefc9a1657792cc504a59acde5d

Citations in the corpus

• Human Capital, Capital Structure, and Employee Pay: An Empirical Analysis (2013, unknown): “9 Cronqvist et al. (2009) find that CEOs with more control pay their workers more.”
• An Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Performance with Moderating Effects of CEO Power and Ownership Structure: A Case Study of the Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan (2019, unknown): “In addition, agency theory postulate that CSR is assumed as shareholder expense and, as a result, leads to lower profit [29,30].”
• Determinants and Economic Consequences of Non-financial Disclosure Quality (2016, unknown): “Literature in support of this argument includes Wright and Ferris (1997), Pagano and Volpin (2005), Surroca and Tribo (2008), and Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009), among others.”
• Corporate social responsibility, product market perception, and firm value (2020, unknown): “The shareholder expense view suggests that CSR is undertaken at the expense of shareholders and, therefore, lowers firm value (Friedman, 1970; Friedman, 1998; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Pagano and Volpin, 2005).”