Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay

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Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey (2011, unknown): “For example, Hall and Murphy (2002) and Dittman and Maug (2007) point out that convex incentives are commonly induced through stock options.”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, background): “ln c1 = r1 5 + κ1 (23) ln c2 = r1 5 + r2 4 + κ2 ln c3 = r1 5 + r2 4 + r3 3 + κ3 ln c4 = r1 5 + r2 4 + r3 3 + κ4 ln c5 = r1 5 + r2 4 + r3 3 + κ5.”
Stock Options and Managerial Incentives for Risk-Taking: Evidence from FAS 123R (2012, unknown): “3 Dittmann and Maug (2007) also argue that it is difficult to justify stock options as part of an optimal compensation contract based on calibrations of a principal-agent model.”
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (2013, unknown): “π = ( L CE α (γμ+ η) Ψ + α (γμ+ η) + βγμ )α(1−γ)( L CM βγμ Ψ + α (γμ+ η) + βγμ )−βγ (17)”