Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

By Lin Peng, A. Röell. 2013

137 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e37cd41cc4def6dbede42c97225fe5cc545f95a

Citations in the corpus

• Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “In a similar vein, Peng and Roell (2008, 2014) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) demonstrate that high-powered incentives that vest in the short term can encourage the manager to expend firm resources to manipulate the stock price upwards.”
• Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “From step 4,  e  is also concave in ()≤, and so the target leisure level ( )≤ solves the maximization problem (49).”