E. Faingold

Management Science and Operations Research · 2010–2011

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 4 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom E. Faingold trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Yuliy Sannikov
  2. Dilip Abreu
  3. Martin W. Cripps
  4. George J. Mailath
  5. Andrzej Skrzypacz
  6. Larry Samuelson
  7. Drew Fudenberg

Papers from E. Faingold's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers E. Faingold trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
  2. Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
  3. A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent
  4. Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
  5. Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
  6. Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge
  7. A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
  8. Optimal Collusion with Private Information
  9. Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much
  10. Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts

Their papers