Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by . . renting U.S. securities laws

By Jordan I. Siegel. 2005

585 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/af1253f06eb91743b9a6f6d713f66058b0ed3a02

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Citations in the corpus

The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world (2008, unknown): “We handle the issue of different 3Licht (2003) and Siegel (2005) claim that U.S. enforcement is not fully effective in the case of non-U.”
Why Do Countries Matter so Much for Corporate Governance (2007, background): “Though there are limits to the enforcement of US securities laws on foreign firms (see Black, 2001; Licht, 2003; Siegel, 2005), there might well be no substitute mechanisms for firms from some countries to credibly bond themselves to good governance (see Ball, 2001; Perino, 2003).”
Internationalization and Stock Market Liquidity (2005, unknown): “…might allow corporations to alleviate agency and informational asymmetry problems by “bonding” themselves into markets with greater disclosure requirements and stronger shareholder protection systems (Doidge et al., 2004; Gozzi et al., 2005; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Siegel, 2005).”
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying (2014, unknown): “Papers have been written using datasets for a number of countries, including China (Yadav 2008), India (Yadav 2008), Japan (Naoi & Krauss 2009), Mexico (Siegel 2005), and Norway (Alt et al. 1999).”
Company reputation and the cost of equity capital (2014, unknown): “Siegel (2005) finds that cross-listed Mexican companies that built good reputations on US exchanges during the 1994 economic crisis subsequently received more equity and debt financing.”
International business responses to institutional voids (2017, background): “This concept has been also explored by Siegel (2005) and others as it relates to foreign firms from institutionally fragile markets ‘‘borrowing’’ institutions through the listing of their securities in developed countrymarkets.”
Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis (2008, background): “Benos and Weisbach (2004), Reese and Weisbach (RW, 2002), Siegel (2005), and Stulz (1999) present similar arguments.”
Forward-Looking Disclosures, Financial Verifiability and Analysts' Forecasts: A Study of Cross-Listed European Firms (2009, background): “However, Siegel (2005) challenges the legal bonding hypothesis with his analysis of Mexican companies cross-listed in the USA.”
The Long-Term Effects of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation (2006, background): “Licht (2001, 2003) and Siegel (2005) are critical of legal bonding, and provide evidence that the SEC and minority shareholders have not effectively enforced U.S. securities laws against foreign firms.”