Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective ☆

By K. Eddleston, Franz Willi Kellermanns. 2007

970 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8c84909e7a9fbce061229aee4610c5753a798e08

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In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

How Lead Founder Personality Affects New Venture Performance (2013, background): “Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) argue that stimulating members to effectively participate in strategic discussions reduces relationship conflict in family firms.”
From Longevity of Firms to Transgenerational Entrepreneurship of Families (2012, background): “Scholars of this tradition have, for example, explored the alignment of different resource configurations and the quality of interactions (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008), and the quality of the institutional setting (Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, &…”
Article Commentary: Family, Wealth, and Governance: An Agency Account (2015, background): “Multiple family owners likely differ in their financial and nonfinancial interests, leading to potential family feuds and conflict (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, & Schoar, 2008; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).”
Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family-Controlled Firms in Japan (2010, background): “Family influence, involvement, and control, resulting from partial ownership of a firm are indeed complex phenomena with both positive and negative consequences for the organization (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007).”
Entrepreneurial orientation and innovation in family SMEs: Unveiling the (actual) impact of the Board of Directors (2018, background): “These insights, combined with the observation that most BoDs in family SMEs are commonly dominated by family members (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007), form our baseline hypothesis on the effect of BoD composition, particularly family involvement in the BoD (Sciascia et…”
Firm Philanthropy in Small- and Medium-Sized Family Firms (2014, neutral): “Philanthropy demands resources that are not attributed to the family, and a small decision-making group may feel less confident in undertaking philanthropic initiatives (e.g., Chirico et al., 2011; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Lubatkin et al., 2005).”
Family Firm(s) Outcomes Model: Structuring Financial and Nonfinancial Outcomes Across the Family and Firm (2017, background): “…been characterized as altruistic with collectivistic orientations that encourage deliberate, thoughtful actions that consider the effects these actions have on the firm, family, and community, presumably to develop or preserve the family or firm’s image and legacy (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).”
Psychological ownership, knowledge sharing and entrepreneurial orientation in family firms: The moderating role of governance heterogeneity (2018, positive): “In fact, PO captures the cognitive and affective mechanisms that explain the family attachment to the business and motivate the emergence of pro-organizational actions (e.g., Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Rantanen& Jussila, 2011).”
The Family's Financial Support as a “Poisoned Gift”: A Family Embeddedness Perspective on Entrepreneurial Intentions (2017, background): “…advantages; for instance, family co-founder commitment to a firm is likely to be high and they may put the firm’s interests before their own (Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007); in fact, founding teams that include a family co-founder are assumed to have performance advantages (cf. Schjoedt…”
The relationship between innovation, knowledge, and performance in family and non-family firms: an analysis of SMEs (2013, background): “A study by Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) found that family firm performance improved when owner-managers involved other family members in the business.”
Family Business Growth Around the World (2020, background): “…contrast, the transgenerational view suggests that families will invest generously in their firm and its growth due to the temporally extended benefits that will bring to their offspring, the firm, and its stakeholders (Arregle et al., 2007; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Miller et al., 2008).”
Organizational Virtue Orientation and Family Firms (2011, background): “…that are manifest in preferences for longer investment horizons (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; James 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) and as providing a higher likelihood of family managers acting as stewards rather than agents (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).”