Puttin' on the Ritz: Pre-Ipo Enlistment of Prestigious Affiliates as Deadline-Induced Remediation

By Guoli Chen, Donald C. Hambrick, Timothy G. Pollock. 2008

166 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Visual Arts and Performing Arts

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a8c5006674c6812174852b56580e29fbc1dd05a

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In Accounting

In Visual Arts and Performing Arts

Timothy G. Pollock

Citations in the corpus

Better Together? Signaling Interactions in New Venture Pursuit of Initial External Capital (2016, background): “In later stage investing, affiliations are important mainly because of their certifying role (Certo, 2003; Chen et al., 2008), but for early-stage investing the emphasis shifts toward the substantive benefits that third parties provide.”
Boards, CEOS, and Surviving a Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Internet Shakeout (2011, background): “be the dominant task for the board (Coles et al., 2008). Similarly, the value of having a CEO also serve as chair of the board of directors is likely to be different for firms in which fast decisions are less important than oversight of top management. If boards and CEOs could be easily and inexpens”
Master of Puppets: How Narcissistic CEOs Construct Their Professional Worlds (2017, background): “Indeed, as noted above, research on boards of directors has demonstrated that the presence of other high-status directors makes it easier to attract (Chen et al., 2008; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) and retain (Boivie et al., 2012) additional high-status directors.”
How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms (2010, background): “Similarly, all directors are typically paid the same compensation and receive the same option or stock grants for serving on the board (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Chen et al., 2008), and therefore will recoup the value of their prestige in different ways.”
The contingent value of venture capitalist reputation (2011, background): “Indeed, research has demonstrated that organizations often pay substantial premiums in order to garner these affiliations (Chen et al., 2008; Hsu, 2004), and investors are willing to pay more for the shares of companies that possess them (Carter and Manaster, 1990).”
Getting What You Need: How Reputation and Status Affect Team Performance, Hiring, and Salaries in the NBA (2013, background): “Research has shown that actors pay higher prices for services or resources obtained from high-status actors, such as higher prices of wines produced by high-status wineries (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) or the higher compensation of prestigious executives and directors (Chen et al., 2008).”
Unmixed signals: How reputation and status affect alliance formation (2014, background): “…in certification contests (Rao, 1994), media rankings (Rindova et al., 2005; Wade et al., 2006), and hiring of prestigious executives and directors (Chen, Hambrick, and Pollock, 2008) have all been shown to reduce uncertainty about firms’ quality and future prospects in the eyes of key…”