How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms
By Timothy G. Pollock, Guoli Chen, E. M. Jackson, Donald C. Hambrick. 2010
306 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/548ccd5dbb4023d4c68b27155947a281f1c62669
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Timothy G. Pollock
- Igor Filatotchev
- Brian L. Connelly
- Violina P. Rindova
- Kyuho Jin
- Gokhan Ertug
- Peggy M. Lee
- Thomas H. Allison
In Management of Technology and Innovation
- Timothy G. Pollock
- Thomas H. Allison
- Violina P. Rindova
- Jeremy C. Short
- Igor Filatotchev
- A. Mckenny
- Ruth V. Aguilera
- Brian L. Connelly
Citations in the corpus
- A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and Accelerators (2017, background): “Although much research revolves around the VC impact and valueadded services on portfolio firm performance, other studies explore the certification value of VC ties on portfolio company performance—especially during exit events like IPOs (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010).”
- Getting What You Need: How Reputation and Status Affect Team Performance, Hiring, and Salaries in the NBA (2013, background): “either affiliates or previous places of work are assumed to be correlated with quality (Podolny, 1994); consequently, high-status actors are expected to have superior abilities (Pollock et al., 2010; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).”
- The power of positivity? The influence of positive psychological capital language on crowdfunding performance (2018, background): “1 The salience of costless signals in examining crowdfunding performance Signaling theory argues that organizations send signals that communicate the quality of the organization to key outside stakeholders such as investors (Certo, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010).”
- Completing the technology transfer process: M&As of science-based IPOs (2012, unknown): “Selection instrument Prone to IPO Selectivity instrument created through Heckman procedure to control for the propensity to go public (Pollock et al. 2010)”
- A Signaling Theory of Acquisition Premiums: Evidence from IPO Targets (2012, methodology): “These three types of interorganizational relationships have been shown to signal the quality of IPO firms and facilitate subsequent economic exchanges such as equity financing, alliances, and acquisitions (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Pollock et al., 2010; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007; Stuart”
- R&D Subsidies as Dual Signals in Technological Collaborations (2019, background): “(Pollock et al., 2010), or by means of sophisticated but indirect econometric methodologies”
- Which of These Things Are Not Like the Others? Comparing the Rational, Emotional, and Moral Aspects of Reputation, Status, Celebrity, and Stigma (2019, methodology): “If a firm can have different reputations or be both a celebrity and infamous with different audiences, what is the cumulative effect of these varying assessments and how do they affect market reactions and firm outcomes? And does the influence of one social evaluation on an organizational outcome va”
- What signals matter for social startups? It depends: The influence of gender role congruity on social impact accelerator selection decisions (2019, background): “In light of prior signaling research suggesting that some sources of investment are perceived as more credible than others (Khoury et al., 2013; Pollock et al., 2010), we urge scholars interested in this area of research to consider examining how the nature of equity or philanthropic investment migh”
- The contingent value of venture capitalist reputation (2011, background): “This is not surprising, as prestigious underwriters are more likely to be attracted to, and willing to underwrite, the offerings of firms in which high-reputation VCs have invested (Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010).”
- Signals across multiple networks: : how venture capital and alliance networks affect interorganizational collaboration. (2013, background): “In this way, new ventures can help mitigate the adverse selection risk that potential exchange partners face, thereby facilitating the new ventures’ future economic exchanges (e.g., Dewally & Ederington, 2006; Hsu, 2004; Nicholson et al., 2005; Pollock et al., 2010).”
- The Impact of Relational Capital on the Success of New Business Start‐Ups (2011, background): “…short production experience , limited track records and resources, and the considerable uncertainty they face, new firms encounter problems in showing the quality of their products to customers and other stakeholders (Pollock et al. 2010; Reuber and Fischer 2007; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999).”
- Master of Puppets: How Narcissistic CEOs Construct Their Professional Worlds (2017, background): “…to gain the rewards—or avoid the punishments—of a narcissistic CEO can also lead to higher performance (Maccoby, 2003), and having a board composed of highstatus directors can yield valuable signaling and resource acquisition benefits (Certo, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010).”
- Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management: The Role of Status (2014, methodology): “This conclusion flows directly from traditional measures of status, such as elite education and public and private board memberships (D’Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein, 1992; Pollock et al., 2011).”
- Corporate Governance and Investors' Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value: An Institutional Perspective (2014, background): “When IPO firms are facing increasing uncertainty, the scope for redundancies in legitimacy signals diminishes (Pollock et al., 2010), and investors become more likely to follow a wider range of standard or institutionalized rules (Pollock et al., 2009).”