The impact of foreign board membership on firm value

By L. Oxelheim, Trond Randøy. 2003

571 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a7fa68a8da1e2cee07b01c2c06cda5d4ec75a09

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Disclosure frequency and earnings management (2007, result): “This measure of Tobin’s q is consistent with those of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Oxelheim and Randøy (2003).”
The Anglo-American financial influence on CEO compensation in non-Anglo-American firms (2005, background): “The non-Anglo-American firm can thus signal its compliance with a more demanding corporate governance system (the Anglo-American) by recruiting an outsider AngloAmerican board member (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003).”
Corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance in China: panel data evidence on listed non financial companies (2011, methodology): “…have relied mainly on Tobin’s Q as a measure of corporate performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, McConnell and Servaes 1995, Himmelberg et al. 1999, Holderness et al. 1999, Demsetz and Villalonga 2001, Oxelheim and Randøy 2003, Wei et al. 2005, Gunasekarage et al. 2007, Gugler et al. 2008).”
Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, unknown): “…that golden shares often have nationally-centered objectives such as keeping the general direction of a firm in domestic hands, against the suggestion of Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) that electing foreign independent board members can serve as a way of importing more demanding governance practices.”
Performance and governance in microfinance institutions (2009, background): “Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) find that firm performance improves with the presence of international directors.”
CORPORATE BOARD DIVERSITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA (2012, background): “Oxelheim and Randoy (2001) examined the effect of foreign board member diversity on firm value in Norway and Sweden, and the result indicates a significantly higher performance for firms with foreign board membership.”
Do women in top management affect firm performance? Evidence from Indonesia (2013, background): “Using a sample of not-for-profit organizations, Siciliano (1995) indicates that gender diversity of board members is positively related to social performance.”
The impact of cultural diversity in corporate boards on firm performance (2016, unknown): “foreignness, are likely to have greater share of foreign board members and, accordingly, greater cultural board diversity (Hillman et al., 2003; Ferreira, 2010; Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003; Masulis et al., 2012).”
Beyond gender diversity: How specific attributes of female directors affect earnings management (2017, background): “Similarly, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) conclude that Norwegian and Swedish firms with foreign directors on their boards have higher valuations than their competitors without foreign independent directors.”
On the internationalization of corporate boards: The case of Nordic firms (2013, unknown): “Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) stress the difference in management style between Anglo-American directors (who may be more focused on shareholder value) and nonAnglo-American directors, who may be more motivated in satisfying a broader set of stakeholders.”
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms (2016, background): “Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) examined the impact of foreign board membership on firm performance in Norway and Sweden and showed that this relationship is positive.”