Variations in R&D Investments of Family and Nonfamily Firms: Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion Perspectives

By James J. Chrisman, Pankaj C. Patel. 2012

1,366 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88e55e77afd73a81f3aeababc7c8b020986c920e

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Citations in the corpus

Conflicting Selves: Family Owners' Multiple Goals and Self-Control Agency Problems in Private Firms (2018, background): “…as a case in point, given that family owners are reported to have particularly high discretion in influencing firm behavior (Carney, 2005) and are characterized by multiple and competing selves that involve both economic and noneconomic motives (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013).”
Family ownership and R&D investment: The role of growth opportunities and business group membership (2015, background): “Hence, enhancing growth potential is conducive to survival and thus consistent with family owners' interest in long-term control goals (cf. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Greve, 2008; Zellweger et al., 2012), indicating that family owners' influence on R&D investment may rely on their judgment of the loss…”
Family Firm(s) Outcomes Model: Structuring Financial and Nonfinancial Outcomes Across the Family and Firm (2017, background): “Often, the family’s goals and aspirations have been inferred based on governance variables like family involvement in ownership and management or generic measures of risk aversion (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012).”
Psychological ownership, knowledge sharing and entrepreneurial orientation in family firms: The moderating role of governance heterogeneity (2018, neutral): “…and cognitive framework to explain how affective endowments influence family firms' decisions related to entrepreneurship and innovation (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011), we believe that our focus on PO and its subsequent stewardship attitudes can…”
A Closer Look at Socioemotional Wealth: Its Flows, Stocks, and Prospects for Moving Forward (2015, background): “…may explain why family firms aspiring to the FCNE benefits of dynastic family control (a flow variable that requires investment) follow a more proactive research and development strategy than family firms mainly concerned about their SEW stock in terms of current control (Chrisman & Patel, 2012).”
The Impact of the Family Background on Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions: An Empirical Analysis (2020, background): “Researchers [32] pointed out a high heterogeneity among family firms caused by a series of factors such as type of goal (economic vs. non-economic, and family-centred vs. business-centred) [33,34], resources, the involvement in and influence of the family upon the business [35–37].”
Innovation processes in family firms: the relevance of organizational flexibility (2016, background): “Whether due to different long-term priorities or risk aversion, many empirical studies find engagement in R&D to be lower for family firms than for non-family firms (Muñoz-Bullón and Sanchez-Bueno 2011; Block 2012; Chrisman and Patel 2012), although there are significant differences within family fi”
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, background): “, willingness) (Chrisman and Patel 2012); the prevalence of agency or stewardship in family firms can be more precisely predicted when accounting for the susceptibility of executives to family”