Cooperation and Punishment

By Jonathan P. Thomas, R. Evans. 2001

122 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/83c19e09490d3384223191913b059332d980dc32

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments (2006, background): “Fehr and Gächter (2000a) found that introducing a costly opportunity to punish tended to increase average contribution levels monotonically, even when subjects were re-ma tched in each period with other groups of subjects, and even in the last period.”
A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons (2011, unknown): “DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.013”
Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism (2006, unknown): “Having a fixed cost of taking one monetary unit from the person targeted differs from Fehr and Gächter (2000), in which there is a rising marginal cost of deducting fixed fractions of the targeted person's earnings.”
Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “The null model introduced above can be easily upgraded to account for peer punishment [65, 93, 172].”
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment (2005, unknown): “JEL Classification: C91, H41, D23 Keywords: Public goods, collective action, punishment.”
Extraversion, neuroticism, and the prisoner’s dilemma (2009, background): “Indeed, behavioral economists have posited that fear of punishment can play a substantial role in the promotion of cooperative behavior (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Hirshleifer & Rasmusen, 1989).”
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans (2003, methodology): “Fehr and Gächter (2000) set up an experimental situation in which the possibility of strategic punishment was removed. They used 6 and 10 round public goods games with group size of four and with costly punishment allowed at the end of each round, employing three different methods of assigning membe”
Saving Power to Conserve Your Reputation? The Effectiveness of Private versus Public Information (2012, unknown): “Our experiment did not allow us to investigate the finer points of reputation as a mechanism, such as whether people were really seeking public recognition and status or avoiding shame or symbolic punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008).”