Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

By Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Ernst Fehr. 2003

1,015 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ba6b4fa72b4809732cf61265088ba9d2e1a9b31

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Safety Research

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Normative Bias and Adaptive Challenges: A Relational Approach to Coalitional Psychology and a Critique of Terror Management Theory (2005, background): “…that, because actions entail costs (in the form of time, attention, energy, exposure to risk, or loss of opportunities to engage in alternate actions), evolution will only favor the propensity to act in a given fashion when, in general, such a propensity generates benefits that exceed its costs.”
Walking Inside the Potential Tax Evader’s Mind: Tax Morale Does Matter (2005, background): “(Buchanan 1995; Gintis et al. 2003; Torgler and Werner 2005; Alm and Torgler 2006).”
Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions (2010, background): “Neither the predatory action nor the self interested action aids the cooperative efforts of other players, but unlike the predatory action, the self interested one does not undermine the success of anybody who is trying to cooperate.”
Game Theory of Mind (2008, neutral): “, [33,34]).”
Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. (2011, neutral): “…biological or cultural selection) if they are responsive to the specific interactive strategies and prospects of social partners and if they take into account reputational consequences and the likelihood of third party punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003, 2005).”
Evolution of the social contract (2014, background): “…do this, the numerous economic games that are being played [Fehr et al., 2002, Camerer and Fehr, 2006, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Gintis et al., 2003, Henrich et al., 2005, Herrmann et al., 2008, Bernhard et al., 2006, Fowler et al., 2005, Egas and Riedl, 2008, Marlowe et…”
The Evolution of Authoritarian Processes: Fostering Cooperation in Large-Scale Groups (2008, background): “The tendency to punish norm deviants and reward norm compliance corresponds to the strategy of strong reciprocity, that is, to cooperate with and reward cooperators and punish defectors (Gintis et al., 2003).”