Do managers listen to the market

By J. Kau, James S. Linck, Paul H. Rubin. 2008

189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7cca3f2434b5f970c5a68a1bba4c7a573f35f5fb

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Citations in the corpus

Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (2015, unknown): “We include the standard controls proposed by the literature (see, e.g., Rossi and Volpin 2004; Luo 2005; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007; Bris and Cabolis 2008; Kau, Linck, and Rubin 2008; Jacobsen 2014).32 Table 6 presents the results.”
Acquisitions and CEO Power: Evidence from French Networks (2009, background): “Acquiring firms usually take into account investors' behavior (Luo, 2005) and particularly , CEOs listen to the market (Kau et al., 2008).”
Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis (2011, background): “Kau et al. (2008) document that managers pay”
Portfolio and Financing Adjustments for U.S. Banks: Some Empirical Evidence (2008, unknown): “Volatility in share valuations in the stock market induces volatility in real corporate investment and GDP as the evidence of Polk and Sapienza (2002), Panageas (2003), Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005), Chirinko and Schaller (2007), and Kau, Linck, and Rubin (2004) indicates.”
High‐Frequency Trading and Market Performance (2020, unknown): “and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Glosten (1994), and Back and Baruch (2004).”
Market-Based Corrective Actions (2010, background): “…assumption, we cannot find an equilibrium without agent-preferred intervention for an intermediate range of κ.20 19 The empirical analysis of Kau, Linck, and Rubin (2008) is consistent with managers considering both the market reaction to the acquisition announcement and their own private…”
Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies (2009, unknown): “For the control variables, we find that (i) acquirers with higher leverage are less likely to withdraw their proposed deals, (ii) relatively larger deals are more likely to be withdrawn, consistent with the evidence reported by Luo (2005), (iii) bids for private targets are less likely to be withdra”